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25 NOVEMBER 1986

## Worldwide Report

# ARMS CONTROL

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# PRC PEOPLE'S DAILY URGES PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT OF SPACE

HK061005 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 31 Oct 86 p 6

["Jottings" column by Zhao Yang (2600 7122): "Creation Yes, Destruction No"]

[Text] An international symposium, entitled "Our Space," was recently held in Tokyo. At this symposium, the chairman suggested in his "keynote speech" that the United States and the Soviet Union should appropriate the enormous investment in space arms development to peaceful development of space and turn the "SDI" (Strategic Defense Initiative) into a "SPI" (Space Peaceful Initiative). His proposal was endorsed by the participants. Doubtless, it reflects the aspirations of the world's peace-loving people.

For many years, the two superpowers have been energetically developing space weapons. As far as the United States is concerned, it is spending much money trying to implement its Strategic Defense Initiative. It is estimated that it will have to spend U.S. $25 billion in conducting research in 5 years. This sum is equal to the total cost of the "Apollo" moon probe project. As for the Soviet Union, it is reported that it is also vigorously developing laser cannon and other antimissile weapons and that its success in some areas is even greater than that of the United States. So it is not difficult to imagine how much money has been and is being spent. By participating in this space arms race regardless of the cost, the United States and the Soviet Union can only bring about unimaginably dreadful results for their peoples and for mankind.

Things would be very different if the Strategic Defense Initiative were turned into a Space Peaceful Initiative. Just as nuclear technology can be used not only in producing A-bombs, but also in peaceful power generation, advanced precision military technology can be used for killing people and for benefiting them. Of the 3,000 satellites put into earth orbit, 70 percent have been military satellites. However, the civilian satellites constituting the other 30 percent of the total number of satellites put into earth orbit have already contributed much to improving people's living conditions. Thus, it can be seen that the civilian use of advanced precision military technology has great potential.

What the people of the world want is peace and development, not the expansion of armaments or destruction. Currently, mankind is under pressure to decide whether to use advanced modern science and technology in cruel killing or to use the crystallization of man's wisdom in developing space for peaceful purposes in order to bring about a better future for mankind.

/9716
CSO: 5200/4015

# U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

## GORBACHEV REPLIES TO WRITERS' FORUM, COMMENTS ON REYKJAVIK

PM281037 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Oct 86 First Edition p 1

["M.S. Gorbachev's Reply to a Question From the Organizers of the Sixth Sofia International Writers Meeting"--PRAVDA headline]

[Excerpt] Question: "What is your vision of the future of the world, mankind, and civilization?"

Answer: The question you asked me to answer is, perhaps, the chief question today. The very fact that it has been asked is a sign of optimism. We, too, are confident that there will be a future.

The best minds of mankind have always believed in the ultimate triumph of reason as an essential condition of normal human life in a community. It is a great spiritual force which enables us Soviet people, too, to be social optimists.

But the future should first and foremost be reliable for all. The only way to follow, as I see it, is to broaden the room of trust between peoples and countries. This calls for a new political thinking, orientated to the solution of the global problems of mankind rather than the arms race, to the peaceful uses of the resources and creative energies at the disposal of mankind.

The motto of your meetings is "Peace is the hope of the planet." I like very much its noble meaning.

It is this striving that pervades the Soviet concept of ensuring security for all, which proposes primarily armed reductions and disarmament. We called for the total abolition of all kinds of weapons of mass annihilation on earth by the year 2000. We have been refraining from nuclear explosions for more than a year now.

At the recent meeting with the U.S. President, Mr Reagan, in Reykjavik, the Soviet side put on the table a package of interlinked proposals which were carefully balanced from the point of view of the interests of the participants in the talks and the entire world community of states. We made concessions to the West in many ways in the hope that it would reciprocate. The main proposals of ours were 50 percent cuts in the strategic weapons, the elimination of all medium-range missiles in Europe, the strengthening of the ABM Treaty and a nuclear test ban. If the American side had accepted the package, a real process of the elimination of nuclear weapons would have got under way.

The situation after the Reykjavik meeting in spite of the well known provocative actions of the U.S. Administration and the gross misrepresentation of what came to pass at the Iceland meeting, still offers opportunities for a search for solutions. It is also a signal to all those who can and must play a role to promote detente and disarmament. Our program of disarmament benefits all.

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CSO: 5200/1081

## KARPOV: 'RAPID BREAKTHROUGH POSSIBLE' SINCE REYKJAVIK

PM301632 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview with USSR Foreign Ministry directorate chief V.P. Karpov by A. Shalnev: "V. Karpov: Solid Foundations Have Been Laid" -- date, place of interview not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] "A rapid, profound breakthrough at the Geneva talks is possible. But, for this, it is necessary to build on the foundations which were laid at the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik, and to build on those foundations, not to revise them," says V.P. Karpov, chief of a USSR Foreign Ministry directorate and head of the Soviet delegation at the talks on nuclear and space arms.

In an interview with IZVESTIYA, V.P. Karpov said:

"What was achieved in Reykjavik -- namely, agreement on the need to eliminate over 10 years all, and I emphasize all, the strategic offensive arms of the United States and the Soviet Union; an accord on the total elimination of American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe; an accord, almost agreed on, concerning the commencement of full-scale talks on ending nuclear explosions -- all this, of course, requires a new approach to the Geneva talks. It is necessary to take a new look at the nature of the discussions, at how much emphasis to place where, and where to focus attention. Unfortunately, we cannot yet say these talks are proceeding in a new way, that they reflect the degree of understanding achieved at the highest level in Reykjavik."

[Shalnev] What do you see as the reason for this?

[Karpov] In the United States, not everyone is pleased with the Reykjavik results. An intensive struggle is under way behind the scenes, the visible results of which are the attempts to modify the content and course of the Reykjavik meeting and what was achieved there. In Geneva, one can clearly perceive on the American side a desire to wrap old proposals in, so to speak, "Reykjavik packaging" and to prevent the talks from emerging from the impasse into which Washington drove them with its position, which basically does not provide for the resolution of the cardinal problems of nuclear disarmament.

[Shalnev] The LOS ANGELES TIMES newspaper reports that according to their instructions the American delegation in Geneva will adhere to a "more gradual approach" -- that is, they will simply delay the talks. THE WASHINGTON POST is more specific: According to its information, the U.S. delegation will try to focus attention mainly on the issue of eliminating nuclear ballistic missiles, thereby revising the consensus reached in Reykjavik, and in effect setting aside the other two components of the strategic triad — heavy bombers with cruise missiles, and sea-launched ballistic missiles.

[Karpov] Reports like this evidently reflect the administration's actual plans. In the public statements made since Reykjavik by U.S. politicians and statesmen one can discern a tendency, so to speak, to revoke what President Reagan said in the Icelandic capital, to revoke his consent to the Soviet proposal on eliminating the entire strategic triad over 10 years. Yet this consent was given when Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev cited highly convincing arguments to the effect that the security interests of the United States and the USSR will be ensured to an equal degree only on condition of the elimination of the entire triad.

Unfortunately this tendency -- to backtrack -- is also visible in connection with medium-range missiles in Europe.

This tendency reflects something which has figured in the U.S. position for a long time — even, perhaps, throughout the period of the Geneva talks on nuclear and space arms: Under cover of talking about nuclear arms reduction, Washington has all the time been submitting proposals permitting...the buildup of the U.S. strategic potential, which, according to available estimates, now comprises some 14,000 nuclear charges.

[Shalnev] Let us come back to the question of medium-range missiles. The impression is created that the United States and some of its allies in Western Europe are moving away not only from the "zero option," but also from the "two-track decision" adopted by NATO in December 1979. That decision, as is well known, provides, on the one hand, for deployment of American cruise missiles and Pershing-2 missiles in Western Europe, and on the other, for holding talks on eliminating missiles.

[Karpov] It is true that a paradoxical situation is emerging. The authors of the "two-track decision," in adopting it, referred to the existence of Soviet SS-20 missiles as the main and more or less only reason for deploying American missiles on the European Continent. Now, however, when the USSR is proposing to eliminate the SS-20's — and correspondingly the American medium-range missiles — the position of those who adopted the "two-track decision" is changing radically. Now, it seems, it is necessary to fulfill a whole series of other conditions concerning, in particular, missiles with a range of less than 1,000 km and conventional types of armed forces and armaments. In other words, the question of the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles is becoming a kind of hostage. Incidentally, speaking of conventional types of arms: Last summer the Warsaw Pact countries put forward radical proposals on this score. A response to these proposals has yet to be received from NATO. NATO is delaying its reply, and in parallel it is making the question of medium-range missiles dependent on the question of conventional types of arms. It is a vicious circle.

[Shalnev] "Star Wars" and the ABM Treaty. Washington is trying to prove that this treaty, far from hampering the "Star Wars" program, could even stimulate it. Is that so?

[Karpov] Article V of the treaty, which was concluded by the USSR and the United States in 1972, bans, in particular, the development [sozdaniye], testing, and deployment of ABM systems or their components which are space-based. Assertions that this ban applies only to the systems which existed at the time the treaty was concluded do not accord with what is actually recorded in the treaty or with the agreed statements on it, in particular agreed statement "D." SDI is incompatible with the treaty in the spirit and the letter. There is no possible way to squeeze the "Star Wars" program into the treaty framework, however you may disguise it.

The American side says SDI is a purely research program, and that the program will remain within the research framework for the 10-year period discussed in Reykjavik. But in fact, the position the Soviet Union put forward in Reykjavik was founded on that very thesis. The West claims the USSR linked the resolution of all other questions at Reykjavik to President Reagan's renunciation of the SDI program, and thereby doomed the meeting to failure in advance. But that is absolutely untrue. We proposed and continue to propose to the President -- our proposals remain in force -- that agreement be reached that research and testing under the SDI program not go beyond the bounds of the laboratories, that there be no tests in space of space-based components of an ABM system, and that what is banned in Article V of the treaty not take place.

If the President has agreed to this, he would have agreed to comply with the ABM Treaty and would have confirmed what he is always saying -- that is, he would have confirmed the research nature of the SDI program. But the President did not do this. That means that there is a very profound difference between the statements about the research nature of the program and actual deeds.

[Shalnev] One last thing: Viktor Pavlovich, what will be your mood, as head of the Soviet delegation, on returning to Geneva?

[Karpov] Very substantial, solid foundations were laid in Reykjavik for making progress, for resolving, above all, the questions connected with strategic offensive arms, medium-range missiles in Europe, and ending nuclear weapon tests. Of course, difficult talks lie ahead. But we are in businesslike mood. If both sides build on the foundations laid in Reykjavik, I think a rapid, profound breakthrough could be secured in resolving the problem of preventing an arms race in space and ending it on earth.

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CSO: 5200/1081

## SOVIET OFFICIALS BRIEF FOREIGN LEADERS ON REYKJAVIK

### Batalin, FRG Parliamentarians

PM281441 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "USSR Supreme Soviet Delegation in FRG"]

[Text] Bonn, 24 Oct -- A USSR Supreme Soviet delegation headed by Deputy Yu. P. Batalin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, which is in the FRG at the invitation of the Bundestag, met on 23 October in Bonn with A. Dregger, chairman of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union [CDU/CSU] parliamentary faction; H.-J. Vogel, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD] faction, and other representatives of the faction; W. Mischnick, chairman of the Free Democratic Party [FDP] faction; members of the "Greens" faction headed by its cochairman A. Borgmann; and H. Stercken, chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Commission, and members of the commission.

The Soviet parliamentarians drew their interlocutors' attention to the assessment of the results of the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik contained in CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev's speeches, in particular his 22 October statement on Soviet television. It was stressed that its results have made it possible to reach new qualitative levels in the struggle against nuclear weapons.

The USSR Supreme Soviet delegation gave a detailed explanation of the Soviet position at the meeting in Reykjavik. Displaying a high sense of responsibility to all the peoples, the Soviet side put forward major, far-reaching proposals, in particular on strengthening the ABM Treaty setup. They offer real opportunities for achieving a breakthrough in international affairs and for averting the threat of nuclear war.

But the U.S. desire, in spite of the ABM Treaty, to effect full-scale implementation of the SDI program and thus secure military superiority prevented this historic opportunity from being exploited and the Reykjavik meeting from ending with a constructive result.

The chairmen of the Bundestag factions expressed appreciation for the fact that the Soviety proposals "took account of FRG anxiety about security matters."

During the conversation with the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation H.-J. Vogel pointed to the document "On the Principles of the Creation of a Nuclear-Free Corridor in Central Europe," which was elaborated by a joint working group of the SPD faction in the Bundestag and the SED political leadership and which the SPD sees as an integral part of global and European efforts to limit nuclear arms and effect disarmament. The Soviet side gave a positive assessment of the document.

During the discussion of questions pertaining to the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe the USSR Supreme Soviety deputies explained in detail the relevant proposals put forward in Budapest by the Warsaw Pact countries. In order to implement them it is necessary to take specific steps; in particular, a working group of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries could be set up.

In connection with the upcoming third meeting in Vienna of representatives of the states that participated in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, both sides expressed the view that it is expedient to deepen the all-European process given a constructive approach and progress in all the areas mentioned in the Final Act of the Helsinki conference. The leaders of the "Greens" faction favored the active involvement of public organizations in this process.

The USSR Supreme Soviet delegation head confirmed that the Soviet Union favors the stable, comprehensive development of relations with the FRG on the sound basis of the Moscow Treaty, with due consideration for security interests, and expects the FRG to adopt the same approach.

The Soviet delegation members gave the West German parliamentarians a detailed account of the major decisions taken by the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet Government on restructuring the USSR economy and on fundamentally updating the material and technical base on the basis of scientific and technical achievements. In connection with A. Dregger's statements about West German business circles' interest in strengthening economic ties with the USSR, it was noted that the Soviet Union deems it necessary to fully exploit the advantages of international division of labor and to seek new forms of economic cooperation with the FRG, and even set up joint enterprises. During the exchange of opinions the sides agreed that the further development of contacts between the two countries' parliaments is an important contribution to improving the international situation and to develaoping political dialogue between the USSR and the FRG.

The meetings took place in a businesslike and constructive atmosphere, in the spirit of the search for new opportunities for collaboration between the two countries in strengthening peace and deepening mutually advantageous cooperation.

### Batalin, Saarland Minister-President

LD271257 Moscow TASS in English 1220 GMT 27 Oct 86

[Text] Saarbruecken October 27 TASS -- A delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet led by Yuriy Batalin, a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, paying a visit to West Germany at the invitation of the Bundestag, today had a meeting in Saarbruecken, the administrative centre of Saar, with Oskar Lafontaine, minister-president of Saar.

The sides discussed in a conversation, which passed in a warm and friendly atmosphere, international developments and cooperation between the USSR and West Germany.

The head of the Soviet delegation noted that the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik had ushered in a qualitatively new state in the struggle for nuclear disarmament. That summit demonstrated that a search for peaceful solutions, meeting the interests of the

USSR and the whole of mankind, could not be discontinued but should be carried on with the vigorous assistance of all thoe forces which have an interest in real disarmament.

The USSR, he stressed, stands for the further development of mutually beneficial cooperation with West Germany in diverse fields. There are sizeable opportunities for that cooperation to grow in the spirit of goodneighbourliness. The machinery of external economic relations is being drastically restructured in the Soviety Union. It will make it possible to resolve problems quicker and to diversify forms of cooperation to the point of setting up joint companies. It is planned to establish direct contacts between immediate producers. The Soviet Union expects trade and economic contacts between the USSR and West Germany to continue to grow dynamically to the benefit of both sides.

The Saar minister-president reaffirmed the desire of his government and the people of that West German land to develop and further broaden comprehensive and mutually beneficial cooperation with the USSR.

## IZVESTIYA Interviews Batalin

PM311450 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview with Yu. P. Batalin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, by IZVESTIYA's Bonn correspondent Ye. Bovkun: "Dialogue of Parliamentarians"--date of interview not given]

[Excerpts] Bonn--The visit to the FRG by a USSR Supreme Soviet delegation headed by Yu. P. Batalin, USSR Supreme Soviet deputy and deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, has ended. IZVESTIYA's Bonn correspondent Ye. Bovkun asked the head of the delegation to tell us about the dialogue which took place.

Naturally, both we and our interlocutors were primarily concerned about this question: How will international affairs develop after Reykjavik? Talking about the future of detente and the chances of nuclear disarmament, we sought to explain the USSR's position to our interlocutors. We stressed that the Soviet Union has put forward bold, unconventional proposals and that in Reykjavik it proved possible to arrive at closely similar views on such complex matters as the phased elimination of strategic arms and medium-range missiles. It was not possible to embody these accords in concrete documents; SDI seemed to everyone to be a symbol of obstruction and unwillingness to eliminate the nuclear threat.

We formed the impression that many of our interlocutors share this concern and recognize the need to learn lessons from the Reykjavik meeting in order to jointly seek ways of resolving disarmament questions. Of course, we did not carry out any polls, but all the same we noticed that in the view of many local politicians and public figures the Soviet proposals meet the interests of all European countries, the FRG included. People in this country's political circles are aware of the responsibility of the governments and parliaments of Europe for the fate of our common home.

We also came up against different opinions, and attempts to revive the old thesis of the "equal responsibility of the two great powers--the USSR and the United States--for the exacerbation of tension." However, the groundlessness of such arguments has been demonstrated repeatedly by life itself. I suppose that this time too the majority of people in the FRG will soon see that the

Soviet Union has been making the greatest efforts to achieve radical progress in the disarmament sphere. But the United States has still not made up its mind to take a decisive step in this direction.

## Chervov, Swedish Officials

LD242151 Moscow TASS in English 2131 GMT 24 Oct 86

[Text] Stockholm October 24 TASS--The Soviet Union's ambassador to Sweden, Boris Pankin, and Colonel General Nikolay Chervov, a Department Chief of the General Staff of the armed forces of the USSR, who is on a visit to Sweden, had a meeting with officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden and representatives of the military community of the country at the Swedish Royal Military Academy.

The Soviet officials explained the Soviet Union's viewpoint of the role and importance of Nordic Europe in the general system of European security and dwelt in detail on the new large-scale and construction approach of the Soviet Union to questions of nuclear and space weapons, put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev at the Reykjavik meeting.

Nikolay Chervov made remarks at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and gave an interview to the Swedish mass media.

## Dobrynin, Indian CP Official

PM281031 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Oct 86 First Edition p 4

["Meeting in the CPSU Central Committee"--PRAVDA headline]

[Excerpts] Moscow October 24 TASS--Anatoliy Dobrynin, a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on 24 October had a meeting with Rajeshwara Rao, general secretary of the National Council of the Communist Party of India, who is in Moscow en route from the Mongolian People's Republic to India.

In the course of their conversation the sides had an exchange of opinion on urgent present-day problems related to the struggle for peace and against the threat of nuclear war. They also touched upon some questions of the international communist movement.

The secretary of the CPSU Central Committee dwelt on the results of the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik and stressed specifically the importance of the large-scale Soviet proposals made at that meeting.

Rajeshwara Rao spoke highly of the foreign policy activities of the CPSU and the Soviet Government. He stressed that the Indian communists enthusiastically supported the Soviet Union's broad initiatives, put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in Reykjavik, the initiatives paving the way to the normalization of the international situation, the prevention of nuclear war and the maintenance of world peace. Rajeshwara Rao noted that the communist party of India was making great efforts to unfold the anti-war movement and involve in it the broadest sections of the Indian people.

## Shevardnadze, Indian Foreign Minister

LD011911 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1828 GMT 1 Nov 86

[Text] Moscow 1 Nov (TASS) -- Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, met today Narayan Dutt Tiwari, minister of external Foreign affairs of India, who arrived in Moscow for a short business visit. In a warm and friendly conversation the sides expressed mutual satisfaction over the high level and the dynamic and versatile development of Soviet-Indian relations and reiterated their invariable striving for the all-around expansion and deepening of those relations.

In an exchange of opinions on topical problems of the present-day international situation the attention of the Indian minister was drawn to the package of interconnected wide-scale proposals from the Soviet Union on a radical reduction of nuclear arms, ending the arms race on earth and not allowing it into space, which was put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik.

Narayan Dutt Tiwari stated the high assessment by India of Soviet peace-loving initiatives which open up the real possibility of achieving the resolving of a number of major issues relating to nuclear disarmament, ensuring a serious change for the better in the development of international relations and the strengthening of mutual understanding and trust between states.

Eduard Shevardnadze noted the positive nature of efforts by India directed at achieving disarmament and ridding mankind of the nuclear threat, and also its constructive work in the Nonaligned Movement and within the "Delhi Six."

The ministers noted the particular importance acquired by the further improvement in the future of Soviet-Indian collaboration on the international scene in the interests of strengthening peace and security in Asia and throughout the world, taking into account the present international situation.

Eduard Shevardnadze gave a luncheon on the same day in honor of the Indian minister of external affairs.

## Gromyko, GDR's Eichler

LD281314 Moscow TASS in English 1206 GMT 28 Oct 86

[Excerpts] Moscow October 28 TASS--Andrey Gromyko, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, president of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., received Heinz Eichler, secretary of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, in the Kremlin today.

The sides expressed the unanimous opinion that after the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik the campaign for eliminating nuclear weapons and averting the militarization of outer space should be pursued with redoubled energy.

The bold and far-reaching proposals put forward by the Soviet Union in Reykjavik, the joint initiatives of the Warsaw Treaty member-states recorded in the documents of the Budapest meeting of the Political Consultative Committee open up vast possibilities for that campaign, the sides stated.

## Demichev, Maltese Official

LD271824 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1600 GMT 27 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow, 27 Oct (TASS) -- Today Petr Demichev, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium received in the Kremlin a delegation from the parliament of the Republic of Malta headed by J. Buttigieg, deputy speaker of the house of representatives.

During the conversation, which took place in a businesslike and friendly atmosphere, there was discussion of issues of Soviet-Maltese relations, as well as some topical international problems.

It was emphasized that the Soviet-U.S. summit-level meeting in Reykjavik had become an important political event in the struggle against the arms race. The Soviet Union had put on the negotiating table a package of bold proposals which made it possible to come close to the adoption of agreements which would have signified the beginning of the scrapping of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, noted Petr Demichev, the Washington administration did not turn out to be ready to reject the idea of achieving military superiority over the USSR by militarizing space.

By distorting the meaning of what happened in Reykjavik, the U.S. Administration is striving to reduce to naught the possibility of accords with the USSR. In this connection the recent step by Washington toward Soviet diplomatic employees, undertaken with the obvious aim of complicating the successful continuation of the Soviet-U.S. political dialogue, is particularly demonstrative.

The outcome of the Reykjavik meeting and the events that have followed it convince one of the necessity of raising the struggle of all peace-loving forces against the nuclear threat to a new level. The USSR's proposals are a real platform for the struggle of all countries and peoples for disarmament and detente.

There was discussion of issues of the further development of the Pan-European process. In this connection the great significance of the successful conclusion of the Stockholm conference, which had made a noticeable contribution to improving the international political climate, was emphasized. Particular attention was devoted to problems of strengthening security and cooperation in the Mediterranean.

The sides positively assessed the present state of bilateral relations and expressed the confidence that the visit by the Maltese delegation would serve the further deepening of mutual understanding and cooperation between the peoples of the USSR and Malta.

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## USSR'S ARBATOV ASSESSES REYKJAVIK TALKS

On Budapest TV

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[From the "Panorama" program: interview with Academician Georgiy Arbatov, director of the United States of America and Canada Institute and member of the CPSU Central Committee, by Alajos Chrudinak; date and place not given -- recorded; Arbatov's replies in Russian with superimposed Hungarian translation]

[Text] [Chrudinak] You took part in the Reykjavik talks. General Secretary Gorbachev said very recently that President Reagan came to Reykjavik with empty hands.

[Arbatov] And with empty pockets.

[Chrudinak] And with empty pockets because, as he said, President Reagan did not want to achieve any kind of agreement. Did this development surprise you, catch you off guard, or were you prepared that the meeting might end thus?

[Arbatov] If I were to say that it was a terrible surprise for me, it would mean that I do my work badly, since as director of the United States of America and Canada Institute, I should have known what (?was in store) for us at the meeting.

I formed the impression, and it proved utterly correct, that in the depths of their hearts the Americans wanted only one thing: to make a kind of cosmetic proposal on medium-range missiles, not a radical proposal. And as for why they did that, first, in my opinion, the real stance of Reagan and his entourage was manifested here: They do not want the arms race to cease. They are embarking on this course only under pressure. They were under pressure at the talks, too.

[Chrudinak] Why did President Reagan say at the end of the meeting that he was disappointed and disillusioned? How did you feel at the moment when everything came to an end there?

[Arbatov] When everything came to an end? You know, now, thinking through the events, I might say: When we traveled there, and when we knew what the proposals were like which we discussed there, or which Comrade Gorbachev discussed, because we discussed only our proposals -- they are not telling the truth now.

[Chrudinak] So they did not come forward with any proposal?

[Arbatove] By no means. They only reacted to our proposals. By the way, now they are even rejecting what they agreed to.

[Chrudinak] Why?

[Arbatov] They are performing sleights of hand. They say we agreed on the disarmament not of all nuclear weapons, not even of strategic nuclear weapons, but...

[Chrudinak, interrupting] Ballistic...

[Arbatov, interrupting] ...on ballistic missiles, that is, they have left out cruise missiles, which are being accumulated in enormous quantities, and strategic bombers. We are not stupid, we have not gone so mad as to accept such an agreement. Of course, we did not do this.

[Chrudinak] However, in his televised speech Reagan said precisely that they made significant proposals at the talks.

[Arbatov] You know, politics is not a strength of this U.S. Administration. However, its strength is public relations and promotion -- it profits from that.

[Chrudinak] In mass information.

[Arbatov] Yes, in mass information, propaganda, promotion. But it developed so that at the beginning they were unable to keep their disappointment a secret.

[Chrudinak] In this connection THE NEW YORK TIMES has written that President Reagan is now trying to make his defeat at Reykjavik look like a victory, a success. What has really prompted the President to make a 180-degree turn in comparison with his negative assessment 1 day earlier?

[Arbatov] Why would he willingly go home as a loser, with, so-to-say, black eyes? I am thinking of political bruises. This would not be pleasant for anyone. It is better to arrive as a victor. Elections are coming up in the United States. But, you know, there are serious problems in Congress also involving the military budget. The President would have liked to twist what happened to his advantage. That prompted him to...

[Chrudinak, interrupting] For a long time the U.S. press has questioned whether President Reagan could hold serious and deep talks on important and complex issues. As an expert -- you were there throughout, you were present in Reykjavik and took part in the talks -- what is your opinion of this?

[Arbatov] I did not take part in the tete-a-tete talks held with Reagan, so I have no personal impression of those. But I would not like to believe that. I am of the opinion that in principle Comrade Gorbachev can talk with Reagan. They are able to understand one another.

[Chrudinak] That means that...

[Arbatov, interrupting] I see something else in Reykjavik. At the experts' night time meetings when everyone was there, Perle, Nitze, Lehman, Kampelman, Adelman, the entire U.S. team, I saw that those people there were not prepared. That is, even if the President were to take a step forward, they would try to pull him back two steps. That was the problem. You know, privately, in conversation, when everything had ended, these people -- I shall not name specifically who said to me: Thank God, they did not sign anything.

[Chrudinak] In his present statements President Reagan stresses that the cause of failure of the Reykjavik meeting must be sought in your wanting to kill their Star Wars program, and that you -- that is, the Soviet Union -- were not willing to make any compromise in this sphere.

[Arbatov] Every compromise has a limit, just as it cannot be said about a woman that she is only a tiny bit pregnant. It is not possible to continue simultaneously the arms race, and stop it. In the last 15-17 years we have witnessed such endeavors to find some kind of middle road. In their time, these were unavoidable, but they did not solve anything radically. The arms race continued and became increasingly dangerous. At the same time we by no means wanted to humiliate President Reagan. Precisely for this reason we did not want to disregard his religious adherence to the Strategic Defense Initiative, the Star Wars program. Thus we proposed that we do not oppose laboratory research, nor laboratory tests. If the President had really wanted to reach agreement on this issue, then he would simply have had to ask: What do you mean by the word laboratory.

[Chrudinak] What do you mean by it?

[Arbatov] Since it was not asked, no one answers. I cannot answer you now. Later, at the talks, if the question is asked, if there are talks.

[Chrudinak] I was able to ask it now.

[Arbatov] But they did not even pose the question. This showed that they do not want to explore some kind of mutually acceptable solution.

[Chrudinak] In your opinion, let us say, can what takes place in a laboratory without walls be called a laboratory test? You understand what I am thinking of. Tests on land.

[Arbatov] Yes. You know, these are all issues which can be clarified at talks, and on which agreement can be reached. But what is it that troubles us? It is possible that it was not born in President Reagan's mind but I know that it is in his mind, and in the thoughts of those close to him. Before he leaves office they want to break up the agreement or antimissile systems, because they are afraid that this will not succeed after Reagan. For this, they would need something, at least a piece of iron to somehow send in to space, with which they would pulverize the agreement on antimissile systems. Similarly, they want to pulverize our agreement concluded on the limitation of strategic weapons, too.

[Chrudinak] So I can say that if the dialogue continues the Soviet Union will be willing to make further concessions in this sphere, for example, to clarify what laboratory tests mean in reality?

[Arbatov] You know, in my opinion, (?you were not right in) asking the question of whether the Soviet Union would make further concessions. Why should the Soviet Union always make them? It is time that the Americans make concessions and view these problems soberly. What do they want? There has been enough mystification. It is necessary to realistically [word indistinct].

[Chrudinak] It is not entirely clear why, when not only yourselves but in the United States, too, certain experts are saying that Star Wars is a mere fiction that cannot be realized, when Comrade Gorbachev himself says that he is not afraid of this cosmic defensive shield.

[Arbatov] Of Star Wars?

[Chrudinak] Of this fiction. So, if that is the case, if that is how matters stand, then why does the Soviet Union reject this space defense so decisively?

[Arbatov] Look, there is more than one thing at issue here. The first thing is: What is it that we are not afraid of? We are not afraid of the concept of the impenetrable shield. This is a fiction. This is not possible, no matter how many dollars the Americans have, and no matter how developed their technology is. This is not a technical problem. Just as, let us say, you cannot make a perpetuum mobile, no matter how developed your technology is. It is folly to act against the laws of physics. No one can guarantee for himself personal immortality, just as you cannot create an impenetrable shield. But there is another space plan: This belongs to those who want to force us into huge expenditures, and -- something we have already spoken to you about -- who want to ruin us economically. We will not take part in this. We will not follow the Americans. We will work out countermeasures that are cheaper. So that is the situation now.

[Chrudinak] That is why it is dangerous.

[Arbatov] That is why space defense is dangerous.

[Chrudinak] Nowadays President Reagan is saying that the reason he needs this space program is because this program, as he put it, defends America against the Soviet Union's deceits.

[Arbatov] You see, this is another of those things Reagan did not even mention in Reykjavik. In Reykjavik he spoke to Gorbachev about something quite different. Gorbachev said to him: After all, I have already made an agreement with you that within 10 years we will eliminate the missiles. Then what is the good of the antimissile defense? Why are you so stubborn? Reagan replied to this: Because some madman might come, some leader, the leader of a small country, who will have a few nuclear warheads with which he might blackmail us.

[Chrudinak] But not from space?

[Arbatov] No, of course. from earth. But a madman like this would not only need nuclear weapons; he would also need intercontinental missiles for this. The space defense system does not provide any defense against, let us say, someone smuggling on board a ship...

[Chrudinak, interrupting] Or in a suitcase?

[Arbatov] Yes, in a suitcase, smuggle a nuclear warhead, or even a primitive aircraft. The space weapons will not give protection against that. But neither is a madman able to build an intercontinental missile. On the other hand, such a missile would be noticed immediately. It could not be concealed.

After this the President returned home and he probably realized what stupid talk this is, and he started to hold forth about what would happen if one day the Russians simply deceived him and hid a few missiles. We proposed that we make an agreement on all possible controls, on the methods of control, because intercontinental missiles are the least possible to conceal. Anyone who does not believe this does not understand anything. They can be observed from every satellite and do not pose any problem.

[Chrudinak] In your opinion, why did the Soviet Union make such significant, such considerable concessions in Reykjavik?

[Arbatov] You know, at times people ask even in our country whether we have not made too many concessions. For instance, in connection with nuclear tests. We have not carried out any tests for over a year now. It will soon be 1 year and 3 months. So, after all, I would say that without compromise one cannot make agreements. Something always has to be sacrificed and one has to examine what is the bigger risk: whether we keep certain weapons and continue the arms race; or whether we make certain unilateral concessions. If I want to be honest, then these are in part concessions not so much to the Americans but to common sense. Let us free ourselves from old conventions -- Comrade Gorbachev also said that we have to break away from outworn stances, from the old, ossified ways of thinking. These are concessions to common sense.

[Chrudinak] In order for you finally to achieve a result, for the agreement to come into being, what essential concessions are you expecting from the U.S. Administration?

[Arbatov] I would not even call these concessions, because they would have to give up...

[Chrudinak -- interrupting] I mean compromises.

[Arbatov] Let them give up the castles in the air. Frankly speaking, let them now keep to what we agreed on in Reykjavik. They must stop misrepresenting things and deceiving people. It is not right that over there we agree on something and at home they say something else. For example, they say that we agreed only on ballistic missiles. That is not true. If we had only been talking about ballistic missiles, then good-bye, then we would not even have gone to meet each other in Reykjavik. I have to say honestly that this is fiction, this is cheating. Shultz himself has said that we agreed on the removal of all strategic armaments.

Second, they have to give up the Star Wars fantasies. Actually, here you are, if this is so close to the President's heart and he wants to continue research then let him do it in laboratories. We can agree as to just what we mean by this, on what kinds of controls there will be. But they must understand that the total destruction of offensive nuclear weapons does not fit in with the development of large-scale antimissile defense.

[Chrudinak] In connection with the destruction of medium-range nuclear missiles stationed in Europe the question arises: Is this sphere of problems inseparable from the other issues of the disarmament package deal, or, in your opinion, could the problem of the Euromissiles be solved separately from the other issues?

[Arbatov] No, they cannot. It cannot be. Of course we again discussed this, on the former, earlier conditions, on the conditions which existed even before Reykjavik -- that is, when it had binding force even with regard to the British and the French not modernizing or increasing their nuclear forces; when we also included forward-based American missiles among strategic weapons. But now a new situation has arisen. At present all this together makes up the package deal which guarantees not only a possible agreement but our security as well, and similarly the security of the Americans. If you take a part of this out, there will be a gap, and this would damage our security. But naturally it is possible to reach agreement, to hold discussions on every single problem, one by one. We do not erect obstacles.

[Chrudinak] In your opinion, where could the desperate and severe diplomatic war lead which has erupted in recent weeks between Washington and Moscow? I am thinking of this unusual policy of diplomatic expulsions.

[Arbatov] It appears that this war is now over. As I see it, it has now ended, because the Americans have understood that Gorbachev can be very flexible and also helpful in his proposals if he is approached in the appropriate manner, if the other side behaves fittingly. But he becomes immediately extremely tough and inflexible if they want to treat him badly, if they start to behave improperly -- politically, of course. He has already shown this to the British and the French as well in similar situations. This diplomatic war is an old trick of bourgeois foreign policy, one which they use against us when they want to shake confidence in us, if they want to disturb circumstances just at those moments when some kind of confidence was beginning to develop. It is at such times that they usually provide some kind of little scandal. The preparation of the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting took place amid such conditions as well. They arrested Zakharov.

[Chrudinak] In your opinion, is there a possibility that there will be another summit meeting, more dialogue between Gorbachev and President Reagan? And if so, when?

[Arbatov] The ball is now in the U.S. court. The picture is clear to them: The dialogue can be continued only if they come up with a new stance.

[Chrudinak] But if...

[Arbatov, interrupting] If they reply to our question. This answer has to come from Washington, in the form of a letter addressed to Moscow, or in the form of a speech; or I don't know how they do it, this will...

[Chrudinak, interrupting] Could they take the step at Geneva?

[Arbatov] Geneva, Geneva. Well, you know in Geneva they have to work on the minor issues, but the major issues will be resolved in the capitals.

[Chrudinak] General Secretary Gorbachev also said that Geneva smells of mothballs.

[Arbatov] It smells of mothballs. It is quite simply dreadful the way these discussions have been distorted. It is simply shameful. Let us just look at Geneva or Vienna. They have been talking for 13 years now; the agreement is ready but they cannot sign it. And what is this agreement about? It is about a less than 1-percent reduction in troops which the two sides have stationed in central Europe. It is ridiculous. They could go on arguing about it for 1,000 years.

[Chrudinak] After what has happened, what do you intend to do now and in the near future? What are your specific plans?

[Arbatov] Are you asking this with regard to my country?

[Chrudinak] Yes, I mean the Soviet Union.

[Arbatov] The Soviet Union. Well, look, the most important thing for us is the acceleration of our socioeconomic development. The full attention of the country, of the people, is focused on this. We have to resolve very major, complex tasks. But we are struggling with a serious commitment for their fulfillment. It is a question of a wide-ranging program of measures which, you see, are aimed at our bringing our econmic work into accord with the demands of the present age, as well as our political and ideological activity. What is more, we want to change public morality and social conditions as well. Enormous changes are taking place in the Soviet Union now. Anyone can see this if he takes a look at the papers or turns on the television. These favorable though by no means easy changes can be seen so clearly. Because it is hard for the old things to disappear from the stage. So that is the most important thing for which we work and struggle.

In foreign policy, with the United States for example, we will try everything possible. We are leaving the door open. Our proposals are on the negotiating table. But in the end if the Americans do not want to agree, what are we to do? Should we commit suicide? Should we commit hara-kari?

[Chrudinak] Do you mean that...

[Arbatov, interrupting] History did not begin with Reagan and will not end with him either.

[Chrudinak] In your opinion, then, is it possible to reach agreement with President Reagan and with the present U.S. Administration?

[Arbatov] We will do everything in order to agree. The accusation is untrue that we take a stand of wait-and-see, that we are always just waiting for the next U.S. president. We consider time to be an extremely important factor. Every wasted month is a blow against the world's security. We are ready to reach a serious agreement with President Reagan but this depends on him, too.

## Remarks on Talks 'Document'

LD300059 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 1830 GMT 29 Oct 86

[Text] As is known, disarmament issues were mostly recently discussed at the highest level in Reykjavik. Georgiy Arbatov, noted Soviet expert on America, spoke about the details of the exchanges of views in his interview with Alajos Chrudinak.

[Begin recording] [Chrudinak] President Reagan now denies that he might have agreed to the destruction of all types of strategic nuclear weapons, on the occasion of his dialogue with general secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik. In your opinion, what is the truth?

[Arbatov, in Russian, with Hungarian translation superimposed] Look, I do not know exactly what words the two of them exchanged, word for word, on this topic. However, it was entirely clear that the American side was also aware -- at least Shultz himself also affirmed this -- that we agreed on the reduction of all types of strategic offensive weapons, that we should reduce not only the number of ballistic missiles, but of bombers and cruise missiles, that is all three elements of the triad of offensive weapons. [Words indistinct] not only in words, but in written form, in three pages. It is not a secret document. I also have it. I regret that I did not bring it with me from Moscow. This document is a draft. It will be followed by guidelines.

[Chrudinak] Might I get it, too.

[Arbatov] I can send you a copy.

[Chrudinak] Thank you.

[Arbatov] So, guidelines for the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union and the United States -- that is in the introduction. We, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, agreed today at the Reykjavik meeting at such-and-such time, that we shall hold the next summit meeting in Washington. Then, three points followed, where the date would have to be written in. Then, the first point went thus: The 50-percent reduction of all three members of the triad, of strategic nuclear weapons -- no matter what Reagan might say about this, it is not true, since all of it is written down.

Then, I also took part all night in the debate held with the American experts, where we managed to come to agreement exactly on this topic. Even Perle agreed to it. We discussed all of it. How can someone say now that we did not talk about that? Is his memory so short, perhaps, that it is not really possible to come to agreement with him, or we cannot believe Reagan? In my opinion, his own people confuse him. [end recording]

[Presenter] You can see the conversation, in full in this evening's broadcast of Panorama. [Panorama television broadcast, published as previous item, does not contain this segment]

## On Moscow TV

LD010050 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 31 Oct 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast; interview with Georgiy Arbatov, director of the United States of America and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, by unidentified correspondent in Arbatov's office in Moscow; date not given -- recorded]

[Text] The results of the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik continue to be the subject of widespread discussion by the world public. One of the central questions being discussed is why Reykjavik ended in failure to reach any concrete agreement. Our correspondent put this question to Academician Arbatov, director of the U.S. and Canada Institute.

[Begin recording] [Arbatov] Yes, the discussion is, indeed, going on, and at times it's assuming some rather strange forms. Some people are saying they failed to agree on one word: Is laboratory research testing, or not? In reality, or course, it wasn't like that. In reality, the failure to reach agreement was due to fundamental differences of opinion. Well, outwardly, of course, it did look like that. Part of the package that we offered was that the ABM Treaty should be preserved; and therefore all these new systems known as Star Wars were to be the subject of further research and testing in laboratory conditions only. And it was on this point, supposedly, that they couldn't agree.

But I thought at the time that it was nonsense that this word was what prevented them from coming to an agreement.

They didn't even ask what laboratory meant. Reagan didn't ask Comrade Gorbachev, and the American experts who sat up all night with the Soviet experts didn't ask either. I took part in the meeting, and they didn't ask us. So that wasn't the issue. They didn't want any restrictions whatever on the SDI program. And why didn't they want restrictions on the SDI program? Because here the question was very concrete and specific: Which way will it go? Are we headed for disarmament, or for a new spiral of the arms race?

All the lies, this whole heap of nonsense that's been piled up, all this rubbish that the Americans are talking about the Star Wars system, about the umbrella, the impenetrable shield and the lot, it's all a camouflage for one simple fact: that they're not against doing something about the existing weapons, but only in order to start an arms race in a new and still more dangerous, still more complex sphere.

Well, it's obvious who has an interest in that. It's in the interest, above all, of those who gain money, those who gain influence, those who gain power -- in other words, the military-industrial complex. But here the question arises, how long can the whole of humanity, the entire development of international relations, be held hostage to that military-industrial complex, hostage to the handful of people who are acting against the interests not only of other countries, but also of their own people? Really, the question I've heard asked is this: How could you make up the package in that way? You knew, after all, that President Reagan is greatly attached to the star wars idea, so you should have known in advance that he wouldn't accept. Well, on the one hand, we did, for face-saving purposes, make provision for laboratory research and testing, and that's all he'll have for the next 10 years; but then, second, you just can't take that attitude to the problem. The whole world can't... [sentence left incomplete]

Why should, even if the man, even if he's not being held by the coattails -- though he is being held by the coattails, one saw that in Reykjavik -- but, you know, even if he is obsessed with this idea, why should this idea that Mr Reagan is obsessed with, why should the whole world submit to it? What are we talking about? Why should -- who gave America the right, the American President the right to dictate? In America the majority of the scientists, a great many people in Congress and many representatives of the public are themselves not in agreement with that idea. so why, why are they trying to impose it on us? They won't succeed; it's an impossibility, and the Americans are going to have to cut their coat according to their cloth. And what they are going to have to bear in mind particularly is that we are not going to allow them to tear up the ABM Treaty and officiate at its funeral, as they'd like.

[Correspondent] The Americans are now showing their negative attitude, not only to the ABM Treaty, but also to other agreements and accords. What is the explanation for this?

[Arbatov] Well, you know, this policy that America is now pursuing under the present administration is becoming more and more difficult to accomodate within the framework of international law. And they're now even trying to find some justification for this -- people close to Reagan. It must be claimed that America doesn't need treaties, doesn't need agreement, that what we need is meetings, negotiations, conversations, dialogue. These, supposedly, will lead to mutual restraint. In fact, of course, in these circumstances, all the talks, and meetings, and dialogue become a fig-leaf with which to cover the shame of a policy that's hostile to the interests of peace and inimical to the interests of the peoples.

But it's very typical that in this situation, in pursuing this policy -- as is becoming more and more obvious -- America is beginning to regard all accords as fetters. They don't like the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, and are about to violate it unilaterally. They don't like the ABM Treaty, and want to violate that, too. America doesn't like many other provisions of international law, and doesn't like the international organizations. The World Court is bad because it decided that America has no right to provide the contras with arms against Nicaragua. UNESCO is out of favor, and America has withdrawn from it. They don't seem to like the United Nations either, they're now undermining the United Nations. The Americans have now arrogated to themselves the right to determine how many people may work at the United Nations from each country. They're now starting to threaten -- they're practicing outright financial blackmail, withholding their contributions to the United Nations. They disapprove of everyone.

America is now in the situation of facing a choice: How can it remain a member of the international community? If they want to stay in they'll have to behave accordingly. Or will they take the path of wrecking all that, so that America can let rip like a drunken cowboy, blaze away in all directions and prance on its horse across a devastated planet? But the planet will not allow that to happen. [end recording]

## PRAVDA Article

PM031707 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Nov 86 First Edition p 4

[Academician G. Arbatov article: "The Echo of Reykjavik: 20 Days Later"]

[Text] There is one question among the many raised around the Reykjavik meeting in which the world public is keenly interested: Why did the USSR and the United States fail to reach an historic accord which would have delivered mankind from the nuclear threat? Was it because they failed to agree on the single issue of where research on and testing of "Star Wars" weapons would be permitted in the next few years -- only inside laboratories or also outside? Or were there some more serious and more profound causes?

I do not wish to accuse those who hold the first viewpoint of shortsightedness or superficiality. There is too strong a desire to end the nuclear threat and begin a normal life, like the almost forgotten life in which there were no fears about the sudden destruction of human civilization. That is why there was such a strong desire to believe that accord had almost been reached, that it was within grasp -- that all that was left was to agree on some seemingly technical details. Honestly speaking, I would very much like to think so. But that is becoming increasingly difficult.

Doubts began arising even in Reykjavik. Let us suppose that, as far as the U.S. president was concerned, of absolutely paramount importance -- greater than that of the liquidation of nuclear weapons -- was the question of where and how the components of ABM weapons close to his heart but still existing only on the drawing board would be tested in the coming decades. Why was it, if that was the case, that he did not even ask: What does the Soviet side understand by the word "laboratory"? Why was it that this question was not asked by U.S. experts of the Soviet experts during the discussion that went on throughout the night?

Doubts increased further still in the light of the administration's words and deeds following Reykjavik, starting with the attempt, while lauding Reykjavik (after all, congressional elections are just around the corner), to simultaneously "dismantle" even what seemed to have been agreed. Moreover, to "dismantle" not some petty details but the actual essence. It was declared, in particular, that the President apparently agreed on the reduction and liquidation of ballistic missiles only, not of all strategic weapons.

This, to put it mildly, is an untruth. I have before me a copy of the document containing the Soviet proposals, which was handed by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to U.S. President R. Reagan, and which was discussed in detail by Soviet and U.S. experts (my copy contains all the amendments and annotations, and I have kept it, as a participant in those discussions). It deals with strategic weapons in black and white. Matters are concretized right down to the quantity of delivery vehicles and warheads. As for the summit conversations, a responsible spokesman of the USSR Foreign Ministry has already cited the relevant statement by R. Reagan himself, testifying to the fact that there was discussion of the liquidation of nuclear weapons and not only of ballistic missiles.

Why lie now? One automatically draws the conclusion that the reason rests in the fact that, following Reykjavik, the U.S. leadership has gone back on its word either of its own accord or because it has been forced to do so.

I am afraid that this is just the beginning. Reykjavik has been praised, it has even been praised in the course of the U.S. election campaign. But the elections will be held 4 November. What will their tune be then? We can only wait and see.

Now let us turn back to the main issue. If there is no confirmation of the version that accord was not reached in the Icelandic capital because of partial, even technical differences, what is at the heart of the matter? My opinion: The present U.S. leadership proved to be unprepared for far-reachng accords on liquidating the threat of nuclear war. It may even be that it did not want such an accord at all.

Thinking matters over soberly, it is difficult to accepted the actual formulation of the issue: Accord was not achieved ONLY because of SDI and ONLY on SDI [capitalized words printed in boldface]. After all, SDI -- no matter how much of a pipedream it may be -- is still not just a detail. It is a concentrated expression of a certain policy. A policy that is incompatible with nuclear disarmament and security.

SDI is primarily an attempt to ensure one's own security with the help of weapons and military technology. And this has never led to disarmament and peace -- only to arms race and war.

Further, SDI is an attempt to ensure security for one side only, while jeopardizing the other side's security. But unilateral security in our time is simply impossible. Our two powers can only survive or perish together.

Finally, SDI is nonetheless an attempt to find a way to wage and win a nuclear war, despite all the President's triumphant statements that he does not believe either to be possible.

Reykjavik shed light with utter clarity on all these contradictions in the current U.S. course and the discrepancy between the administration's words and actions. If, say, in 10 years all nuclear weapons will have been eliminated, why sacrifice this great cause for the sake of a weapons system for which there will not even be any targets -- ballistic missiles -- in 10 years' time?

President R. Reagan's explanations on this score were uncommonly unconvincing. He told M.S. Gorbachev something about a madman who might suddenly acquire several nuclear charges and blackmail the entire world. But could a "madman" really acquire nothing more nor less than an ICBM? Yet SDI is only of use against such missiles; it is powerless against cruise missiles or planes, let alone a saboteur with a nuclear bomb concealed in a suitcase.

In the United States the President was even more frank. There he spoke not of some anonymous "madman" but of the Russians. It is they -- "they should not be believed" -- who could allegedly conceal a number of weapons, and then things would be bad for the United States. He could not agree to leave the American people defenseless (that is, without SDI). What stupendous "logic"! -- first, it alleges that someone could conceal ICBMs (even given strict verification [kontrol] measures), second, how exactly could the U.S. President protect the American people against a nuclear attack? He could not, neither today nor in the foreseeable future. This was also pointed out to him by U.S. critics who noted that SDI would still be at the testing stage in 10 years' time. The only way to protect one's people against the nuclear threat is to destroy nuclear weapons, both your own and the other side's.

That is what the Soviet Union proposed in Reykjavik, but it was rejected by the U.S. President for the sake of the "Star Wars" chimera. And, third, if the President is so suspicious of the Russians and expects them to cheat whatever the verification [kontrol] methods, why, one wonders, did he go to Reykjavik and agree to arms reduction talks with the USSR? We will not even ask whether these suspicions are founded or not. Here is an eloquent fact: In one of his down-home tales to convince the American people of the need for SDI, he gave himself away. It turns out that he was not serious about negotiating and had absolutely no intention of reaching agreement.

Then the Reagan administration's position toward treaties -- on limiting strategic arms, on ABM defense, and others -- becomes clear. It has no time for them; it merely feels inhibited by them. The same is true of international organizations -- from the International Court and UNESCO to the United Nations. That is logical: If it gambles on force, weapons, and military hardware, international law becomes burdensome and there is only room left for the law of the fist.

So, the reader will ask, how come agreement was almost reached in Reykjavik? The fact is that each week there are more and more doubts about that "almost." How serious was the President himself? How advantageously could he have "sold" his positive decision? On returning home, how, in particular, could he have won the support of those who were already counting the billions that SDI and the arms race will cost and those who have already estimated how to warm their hands on international tension.

The other day eyewitnesses quoted to me the words of an anonymous ranking U.S. figure: "Thank God the President didn't sign anything in Reykjavik!" What if he had? Would not the current leaders of America then treat that agreement the same way they are planning to treat the SALT and ABM treaties?

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## USSR: LATEST U.S. NST PROPOSALS CONTRADICT REYKJAVIC RESULTS

### Bomber, ALCM, ABM Issues

LD291752 Moscow TASS in English 1655 GMT 29 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow October 29 TASS -- TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

The U.S. administration, according to White House deputy press secretary Larry Speakes, instructed the U.S. delegation to the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons to begin serious discussions on the basis of what had been achieved in Reykjavik. Speakes said that the administration considered it possible to achieve progress on the foundation laid in Iceland.

These statements sound serious enough and could be viewed with optimism if the instructions to the U.S. delegation, first, were really based on the foundation laid in Reykjavik and if, second, the American negotiators had been instructed to look for realistic ways out of the deadlock caused by the American Strategic Defense Initiative in the entire process of nuclear disarmament.

Yet in reality things, regrettably, are very different. To begin with, the U.S. delegation has been instructed to press ahead at the talks with a distorted rather than true accord on nuclear armaments that had been reached in Iceland. According to the ASSOCIATED PRESS, what the Americans will propose is the abolition of not all the strategic offesive arms by 1996, which was agreed upon in Iceland, but only of the Soviet and American ballistic missiles.

The bombers and air-launched cruise missiles in which the U.S. has a clear edge are not going to be scrapped by Washington. As for statements on the possibility of reaching progress at the Geneva talks, they are intended to mislead both American and world public opinion.

Spokesmen for the joint chiefs of staff, unlike Larry Speakes, were quite frank: They said the joint chiefs of staff had decided not to object to the American proposals on nuclear weapons because the Soviet Union would turn them down anyway. The CBS TB company reports that, in the view of the Pentagon brass, if those proposals are to be declined, let it happen in Geneva. All this clearly shows that the U.S. delegation to the Geneva talks has been given not what was mutually acceptable to the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the U.S. President in Reykjavik but what suits the U.S. military-industrial complex.

As for the tightening of the ABM Treaty, the U.S. Administration, as repeated statements of its senior officials, including the President, indicate, insists on its obstructionist stand: All the planned work under the SDI programme is going to be carried through, which means that the administration intends to continue to subvert the treaty. Does this testify to the U.S. readinesss, as Speakes says, to begin serious discussions? Hardly so.

One more question prompts itself: Are not the authors of the "instructions" to the U.S. negotiating team in Geneva merely going to thwart the talks, which are intended to complete constructively what was started in Reykjavik, to find ways of overcoming obstacles identified in Iceland and to produce mutually acceptable accords? That is the impression one is getting because the untenability of the "new" American stand is glaring.

## Reagan Speech Hit

LD310412 Moscow World Service in English 2300 GMT 30 Oct 86

[Excerpts] Speaking in Rapid City, South Dakota, on Wednesday President Reagan said that the U.S. arms control proposals offered in Iceland remain on the table. We are ready to take up where we left off in Reykjavik, the President said, during his campaign rally for a Republican senator.

Good evening. It's truly indicative, I think, that Reykjavik is in the center of attention during the current election campaign in the United States. There can be no doubt in my view that the public sentiments are in favor of continuing the process started in Iceland and the political leaders fully realize this. The thing is, however, that the process of seeking mutually acceptable agreements on cutting and eliminating nuclear arsenals requires concrete deeds. What is absolutely necessary, in my opinion, is both sides' readiness to adhere to what was agreed upon in Reykjavik with regard to nuclear weapons. How can there be any progress if the United States disputes the basic understandings reached there?

I wonder whether all the Americans are familiar with the fact that Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan came to terms in Reykjavik on a 50 percent reduction of strategic arms in the next 5 years and on the full liquidation of all strategic weapons by 1996.

Now it looks strange but the basic and far-reaching agreements on nuclear weapons taken on the Soviet Union's initiative are being revised in Washington. For example, high-ranking officials of the Republican administration assert that the President did not give his consent on eliminating all strategic weapons of both sides by 1996. Moreover, some major instructions just sent to the American delegation at the Geneva talks actually repeat the pre-Reykjavik position of the United States -- I mean the position with respect to both nuclear weapons and the Star Wars program -- judging by the information leaked into the American press.

On Wednesday, the United States President said: We want to confirm and build on the agreements reached in Iceland. In this connection the question arises: Why do the instructions to the American delegation in Geneva run in an opposite direction?

# U.S. 'Backing Away'

PM311472 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Oct 86 First Edition p 5

[Vitaliy Korionov "Political Observer's Notes": "Levels and Sublevels Again?"]

[Text] The peoples are waiting with rapt attention to see the outcome of the accords agreed in Reykjavik, whose implementation was prevented by Washington's adherence to the "Star Wars" program. The attitude taken to the agreed accords is the touchstone which proves the true value of the words and declarations of the politicians who participated in the meeting.

The Soviet Union's position is extremely clear: Our country has put the utmost goodwill into its proposals and we are not withdrawing them.

What about the U.S. side?

We have already written more than once about the ruckus raised in Washington about what exactly the U.S. President said at Reykjavik. "Explanations" and "elucidations" have flooded out of official offices to the effect that the President "misunderstood," "meant something else," and so on and so forth.

It is now becoming more and more clear that these statements were a kind of smoke screen intended to cover up the feverish activity being conducted by extremely influential circles who were scared to death that the arms race might be stopped. The aim of these forces is to erect as many obstacles as possible in order to emasculate the process begun in Reykjavik.

Particular zeal has been shown, the U.S. newspapers write, by "ranking military leaders," who sought to ensure that their "wishes" were taken into account, particularly when the instructions to the U.S. delegation at the Geneva nuclear and space arms talks were being worked out. And the results of these circles' activities are now clearly surfacing.

White House deputy press secretary Speakes officially announced that the administration had sent the U.S. delegation in Geneva "definitive instructions." Moreover, Howard, the other White House deputy press secretary, announced: "The time has come for action at the talks instead of public debates." And it was revealed that a totally different mechanism had been "put into action" in the U.S. capital -- a tried and tested system for "leaking information."

In particular, the contents of the "whole range of proposals approved by the President," was set forth by AP. And what did we see? The same old picture that plagued the peoples at the previous talks. The AP report again features the notorious levels and sublevels which were a real hindrance at previous stages. There is again a mass of figures whose purpose is obvious: to confuse the essence of the issue.

The Washington correspondent of Britain's THE GUARDIAN filed typical information. Citing "ranking administration representatives," he reported: "In the new instructions given to the U.S. delegation at the Geneva talks the U.S. side stuck to the line that it was aiming [imelas v vidu] to eliminate only intercontinental strategic missiles, but not nuclear-capable bombers or cruise missiles."

Thus, it is the same old story: The United States wants at all costs to quietly leave heavy bombers carrying cruise missiles and other nuclear weapons out of the elimination equation. But if the aforesaid press reports accord with reality, it means that Washington has gone into reverse and is backing away from positions already agreed at the meeting in the Icelandic capital.

What are the forces molding the adminstration's line? A report broadcast by CBS TV can serve as an answer: Pentagon spokesmen stated that the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had decided "not to object to the new U.S. proposals in Geneva" (which, we note, to all appearances contain nothing new). But the indication contained in the report that the generals' blessing was given "because, as one officer stated, the Joint Chiefs believe that the Soviet representatives at the talks will not accept the proposals" is particularly interesting. That is the heart of the matter. They put forward "proposals" deliberately aimed at pinning responsibility on the Soviet side. How can one describe an adminstration that gives such instructions to its delegation at responsible talks? It comes to the negotiating table harboring a grudge.

## Military-Industrial Alarm

PM311623 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Oct 86 Second Edition p 3

[Military observer V. Chernyshev article under the rubric "TASS Commentary for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA": "Washington: Backtracking from Reykjavik"]

[Text] According to L. Speakes, White House deputy press secretary, the U.S. Administration has sent instructions to the U.S. delegation at the talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva. "We are ready to embark on serious negotiations based on what was achieved in Reykjavik... We consider it possible to achieve progress proceeding from the foundation that was laid in Iceland," Speakes declared.

Outwardly these statements seem serious enough. They could be viewed with optimism if, first, the instructions to the U.S. delegation were really based on the foundation laid in Reykjavik, and, second, if the U.S. negotiators had been instructed to seek realistic ways out of the impasses into which the U.S. SDI has put the whole process of nuclear disarmament.

However, unfortunately, this is by no means the case. For one thing, the U.S. delegation at the talks has been instructed to push through a distorted rather than the true version of the accord on nuclear arms reached in Iceland. According to AP they want to discuss the dismantling by 1996 of only the Soviet and U.S. ballistic missiles and not all strategic offensive arms as agreed in Iceland. Washington officialdom has no intention of totally scrapping the bombers and air-launched cruise missiles in which it has an outright advantage.

Now it has become clear why all hell was let loose in Washington around the results achieved in Reykjavik, why all kind of "clarifications" and "explanations" were necessary claiming that the president was "misunderstood," that what he meant was "something quite different," and so forth. Forces that fear an end to the arms race more than the devil have gone into action. Their aim is to create as many obstacles as possible on the path of progress and to emasculate the process initiated at the Soviet-American summit.

In actual fact the U.S. President agreed in Reykjavik with the reasoning of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in favor of finding a radical solution to the problem of strategic arms which would not sidestep the elimination of other dangerous types of nuclear arms -- in addition to ballistic missiles, that is. Neither did R. Reagan object to a broader approach, letting it be known that he was not opposed to the elimination of all nuclear explosive devices by the end of two 5-year periods. Furthermore, the President expressed the idea that if there was agreement "to eliminate all nuclear arms by the end of a 10-year period," this accord could be passed on to the delegations in Geneva. It was the U.S. side's consent to this radical solution of the problem of nuclear arms that made it possible to reach a mutually acceptable accord on strategic offensive arms in Reykjavik.

That the sides were close to concluding an agreement banning all strategic weapons was confirmed by Secretary of State G. Shultz at a press conference in Reykjavik at the close of the meeting and subsequently at a briefing for congressmen in the White House 14 October. Senator S. Nunn, who attended the Shultz briefing and a subsequent meeting with President R. Reagan, has said: "In response to my question whether the President had really agreed to M.S. Gorbachev's proposal 'to destroy all strategic offensive arms by 1996,' the President answered affirmatively by nodding his head." According to THE NEW YORK TIMES, U.S. officials admit the President "agreed, at least in a preliminary manner, that an overall agreement could include a ban on all strategic offensive arms." In his 16 October speech the head of the White House himself said outright: "Mr. Gorbachev and I were able to come closer to finding the magic formula that would permit us to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in our respective arsenals and even to eliminate them altogether."

Not for nothing did all this greatly alarm the representatives of the U.S. military-industrial complex. So, for instance, Z. Brzezinski, the well-known advocate of anti-Sovietism, has just written in an article published in the U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT: "The Soviets...dragged the President into a discussion about a 'nuclear-free' future ... When the Soviets unexpectedly submitted their specific arms control proposals to the President, he should have said that he would study them carefully... In that way the Soviet proposals would have been parried and the concessions would have stayed in our pocket. Instead, the United States went and swallowed the bait..."

And so Washington officialdom is now trying to dissociate itself from what took place in Reykjavik, it is referring to what were essentially intermediate positions while the talks were going on. "Correcting" the president's stance after the event, they are trying to secure superiority for the United States. If the ballistic missiles were dismantled by both sides, F. Ikle, under secretary of defense, has said, the United States "would be in a slightly better position" compared with the USSR, and the strategic balance would revert to what it was in the early sixties. A "numerical background" was provided by specialists from the Rand Corporation who worked out that the United States has a 3:1 advantage in cruise missiles and strategic bombers.

As for Mr. Speakes' statement about the "possibility of achieving progress" at the Geneva talks, it is designed to deliberately mislead both the American and the world public. As distinct from Speakes, spokesmen for the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed themselves with utmost frankness on the subject then they said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff "decided not to object" to the U.S. proposals on nuclear arms because the Soviet Union would "turn them down" anyway. "If these proposals are to be rejected, let it happen in Geneva" -- this, according to the CBS network, is the opinion of the Pentagon military leadership. This clearly confirms that what the U.S. delegation at the Geneva talks is being fed is not what was mutually acceptable to the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the U.S. President in Reykjavik but rather what "suits" the U.S. military-industrial complex.

And as for tightening the ABM Treaty, numerous statements made after Reykjavik by ranking representatives of the U.S. Administration including the President indicate that Washington officialdom continues to cling to its obstructionist stance, insisting that all the work planned under the SDI program will be carried out which means that it intends to continue to work toward destroying the treaty. Does this testify to readiness "to embark on serious negotiations" -- to use Speakes' words?

Another quite legitimate question also arises: Are the authors of the "instructions" to the U.S. delegation in Geneva not simply trying to thwart the talks that are meant to find a positive conclusion to what was begun in Reykjavik, to identify the potential for eliminating the obstacles which came to light in Reykjavik, and the elaborate mutually acceptable agreements?

## Return to Limits, Sublimits

LD040433 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 3 Nov 86

[Igor Pavlov commentary]

[Text] In Geneva the American side has gone back to limits and sublimits in strategic offensive weapons reductions instead of building on the breakthrough which was reported to have been achieved in Reykjavik earlier this month. Here is comment by Igor Pavlov of our staff.

Speaking at a news conference on October 12th in Reykjavik and in his subsequent appearances on Soviet television, Mikhail Gorbachev has taken a shot at the American position which sought to confuse the crux of the matter with all those limits and sublimits, in short, with a lot of arithmetic. The Soviet proposal deals with a 50 percent across the board on all such weapons in 5 years. In other words, by the end of this 5-year period both sides could have the same mix of weapons they have not, but only reduced in size by half. By contrast it takes a wizard to grasp the technical side of the American offer. True, each negotiator in Geneva, Soviet and American, can rely on a pocket calculator to add and subtract, multiply and divide.

But why seek to complicate matters with an avalanche of figures? Here's an example of some of the numbers mentioned in the United States proposals. Of the 6,000 warheads and air-launched cruise missiles for each side, no more than 4,800 can be warheads on ballistic missiles. Of the 4,800 warheads no more than 3,300 can be on landbased missiles. Of these 3,300 warheads, no more than 1,650 warheads can be on heavy missiles. You see my point? There are more numbers, figures, limits, and sublimits to be sure. So if you wish, we could go on with them for another 5 minutes.

Now back to our question. Why seek to complicate the delicate business of arms reduction with all this? Judging by some initial reactions in the United States itself, the new American plan continues to impose these limits and sub-limits with a view to restructuring the Soviet Union's force of landbased missiles; the mainstay of its nuclear arsenals. Just because the White House dislikes some Soviet weapons -- as if this country is supposed to like everything there is in the American arsenal -- it seeks to dictate to us what sort of intercontinental ballistic missiles this country may have. The outcome of the Reykjavik summit continues to be revised in Washington.

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# TASS REPORTS NST SESSIONS 23 OCT-4 NOV

## Strategic Arms Group 23 Oct

LD231451 Moscow TASS in English 1436 GMT 23 Oct 86

[Text] Geneva October 23 TASS--A meeting of the group of strategic arms was held in the framework of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms here today.

## Space Arms Group 28 Oct

LD281432 Moscow TASS in English 1423 GMT 28 Oct 86

[Text] Geneva October 28 TASS--The group on space arms at Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons had a meeting here today.

## Strategic Arms Group 29 Oct

LD291256 Moscow TASS in English 1250 GMT 29 Oct 86

[Text] Geneva October 29 TASS--The group on strategic armaments held a session here today within the framework of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space armaments.

## INF Group 30 Oct

LD301209 Moscow TASS in English 1206 GMT 30 Oct 86

[Text] Geneva October 30 TASS--A sitting of the group on medium-range nuclear weapons was held here today within the framework of Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons.

## Space Arms Group 4 Nov

LD041310 Moscow TASS in English 1202 GMT 4 Nov 86

[Text] Geneva November 4 TASS--The group on space armaments has held a meeting here today within the framework of the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space armaments.

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## TASS HITS PERLE COMMENTS ON NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING SESSION

OW231222 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0300 GMT 22 Oct 86

[Konnov commentary from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] The NATO Nuclear Planning Group has begun its 2-day session in Gleneagles, Scotland. Here is our commentator.

[Konnov]' Hello comrades. Discussion on the results of the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik is the main agenda item of this leading NATO organ.

It is known that the USSR presented a package of important measures for nuclear disarmament at the meeting. The achievement of an agreement was wrecked by the U.S. side's unwillingness to give up its SDI program which is aimed at militarizing space.

The session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, which began today, has shown very clearly once again the U.S. obstructionist position. The following circumstance deserves attention. Normally at such sessions most strict measures are taken to prevent any information leak. This time the leak was clearly deliberately allowed. Even before the official opening of the session, Richard Perle, U.S. assistant secretary of defense, who came to attend, said in an interview to BBC televisin that he was utterly proud and satisfied that the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik did not lead to an agreement. Then this representative of the U.S. military-industrial complex added that the U.S. Administration intends to proceed full speed on SDI work and does not intend to be limited to laboratory testing. In addition, said Perle, the United States will never go as far as destroying all the nuclear arms in Europe.

Well, Richard Perle has once again shown the cards of those circles in the U.S. Administration which unfortunately continue to persistently strive toward the unattainable target of strategic superiority over the Soviet Union.

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## USSR: FURTHER COMMENTARY ON REYKJAVIK TALKS OUTCOME

### TASS Hits Kohl Remarks

LD242013 Moscow TASS in English 1950 GMT 24 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow October 24 TASS -- TASS Political News Analyst Aleksey Shestakov writes:

Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl was the first head of government to hurry on a visit to Washington after the latest Soviet-American summit. He described the goals of his visit in an interview to the West German ZDF TV programme as "stock-taking" after Reykjavik and expression of "gratitude" to the U.S. president for his having stood up staunchly for Western interests.

Kohl was doing "stock-taking" and lavishing praise on the President simultaneously and it sometimes seemed that the wild idea had become reality and the West German chancellor talked English, like the U.S. President, and not German. I always thought the U.S. did the right thing by pursuing SDI research and we as the Federal Government supported it, Kohl told an NBC TV programme, and added that the Reykjavik meeting would have been impossible without SDI. Then he patted himself on the back for having deployed U.S. first-strike nuclear weapons, Pershing-2 and cruise missiles, in West German territory and, echoing Reagan, threw overboard Reagan's "zero option" on those armaments. "When you ponder a situation in Europe and the intermediate-range nuclear forces, it is clear that they cannot merely be taken away and abolished," Kohl said.

Here is good old schooling for you! The U.S. Administration was clearly unwilling to accept its own "zero option" put before it in Reykjavik (renunciation of the Pershings in exchange for the renunciation of the Soviet SS-20 missiles) and it blocked it along with the entire Soviet package of proposals. Immediately the federal chancellor, who had until recently been clamouring for "world with the progressively lower amounts of weaponry" and asserting that the American Pershings in West Germany were merely a counter balance to the Soviet SS-20's, began to claim that those missiles could not be merely abolished. American propaganda is either ignoring or misrepresenting the Soviet proposal on freezing the numbers of missiles with ranges of less than 1,000 km and on immediate talks on this problem. The chancellor is pretending, too, that there has been no such proposal. He keeps talking about "the Russians' overwhelming superiority in conventional weapons," disregarding in so doing both objective figures, which show that there is no such superiority, and the absolutely concrete proposals of the Warsaw Treaty member countries in that field: the NATO countries, including West Germany, are yet to reply to the "Budapest Initiative" put forward a few months ago.

The loyalty of Bonn to Washington is obvious not only to Moscow. Why then should Chancellor Kohl say in a number of interviews to the U.S. press, "I am not America's arms-bearer?" Why should he keep repeating heart-rending stories about free soup he had been given as a teenager by the Americans after the war?

Helmut Kohl is fond of pointing out in his public statements that he has been a politician "since school years." Such an early start in politics in indeed noteworthy, as is his unchanged political stand ever since that time. Meanwhile, it is not enough for today's statesman just to cram in a lesson. The present age calls for new political thinking because it alone can keep the world from stepping over the last dangerous line.

## 'Missed' Opportunity Remains

PM271235 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 1

[Editorial: "A Responsible Approach Is Needed"]

[Text] A great deal has already been written about the Reykjavik meeting. Both here and abroad. The meeting was an important event in international life. It would be no exaggeration to say that the attention of billions of people was immediately riveted on it: After all, fundamental questions of world politics -- the cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament -- were being raised in Reykjavik.

There are, as it were, two dimensions to the history of the meeting: It can be measured in a few weeks and in 4 decades. It took less than 2 weeks to organize it. But those weeks absorbed all that mankind had experienced in the 4 decades since the summer of 1945 at the test site in New Mexico, when the atomic device was exploded and a new era -- the nuclear era -- began. The eternal agony of those who died during the atom bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the eternal suffering of those who survived the bombs but cannot forget the deaths of loved ones; anger at the creation of more and more increasingly sophisticated nuclear weapon system' and bitterness because the tireless efforts to eliminate once and for all the threat of a worldwide catastrophe have not yet averted that threat -- these have been notable features of the 4 decades.

Meanwhile the nuclear era is gathering pace. What will the world be like at the junction between the second and third millennia? Will it have been possible to establish a new era without weapons and wars, or will the nuclear era carry on into the year 2000?

In suggesting the Reykjavik meeting the Soviet Union was prompted by one concern: a sincere wish to adopt the kind of measures which would make it possible to achieve a cardinal breakthrough in the world situation. It is impossible to do this alone. The other side must have the same intentions, the same resolve and willingness to enter the new millennium having shed and having relieved mankind of the nuclear burden, the burden of death.

Of course, intentions and aspirations alone are not enough. There have been quite enough protestations of love of peace as it is. Action is needed. It was with a proposal for concrete action that CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev traveled to Reykjavik. A whole package of major, far-reaching, and interrelated measures, which, if adopted, would open up a new era in mankind's life -- the nonnuclear era -- was placed on the negotiating table. The package was based on our program for nuclear disarmament by the year 2000.

The proposals were so radical that, as Washington officials frankly admit, the U.S. delegation at the Reykjavik meeting was simply amazed: Apparently they had not expected the Soviet Union to go so far. Indeed, in putting forward these proposals the USSR took a broad and very bold step. But the step was based on a sober, realistic analysis of the present world situation, on an objective appraisal of where mankind would go and where it would end up unless nuclear weapons, terrestrial and those planned for insertion into space, were eliminated. For good.

We have every right to expect a reasonable reply from the United States: The proposals put forward by the Soviet side took account of Washington's wishes. By making concessions we demonstrated to the world and to the U.S. public how essential it is now to have a new mental approach, one that corresponds to the nuclear era, that gives rise to original ideas which aim not at quick, one-sided gains but at indubitable advantages for all.

Our proposals are based on the principles of equality and identical security and scrupulous consideration of the interests of both countries, their allies, and the peoples of all states.

Hence the broad support in the world for the Soviet side's position. The meeting of Warsaw Pact states' foreign ministers expressed a high opinion of the course defended by M.S. Gorbachev in the difficult and dramatic debate about the destiny of peace. As the world congress of peace-loving forces, which ended in Copenhagen the other day, confirmed, our proposals, our demands are not only in harmony with but coincide completely with the hopes and aspirations of all for whom the destiny of peace if precious.

The U.S. delegation clearly had other ideas. Although Washington is still insisting that the President went to Reykjavik fully laden, this insistence is no more than an attempt to whitewash itself in the eyes of world and U.S. public opinion, an attempt to create the impression that the lack of binding accords was the Soviet Union's "fault," that it was due to Soviet "intractability." If the package of very serious proposals -- by nature compromise proposals, moreover -- are evidence of intractability, then how would one describe the position of the United States, which did not bring to Reykjavik a single new idea, a single new approach, and which failed to bring a single idea containing even a hint of a solution, of any progress at all?

Had not the White House programmed a fruitless meeting in advance? If so, then why, in whose interests?

In the interests of ordinary Americans? Scarcely: Americans, like all other people in the world, are tired of constantly living next to mountains of weapons, tired of fearing for their future, for the future of their offspring. But, evidently, those for whom weapons mean not millions and not even billions of dollars are not tired. It is estimated that the "Star Wars" program will cost at least several trillion dollars. If thousand-dollar bills were placed one on top of another, the "pillar of money" made up of one trillion dollars would rise to a height of nearly 100 km. The profit from "exclusively nuclear" weapons seems pathetic compared with what the "Star Wars" program promises for the military-industrial complex. Is this not one answer to the question why the U.S. delegation refused to make serious moves on the question of SDI?

It was not the only factor, of course. There was also Washington's unwillingness to display a new mental approach, to recognize that in the nuclear missile era it is a complete illusion to expect to achieve military superiority and ensure potential "personal survival" in a conflict, even if the most up-to-date scientific and technical developments, including space weapon developments, are used to that end. There was also an element of clinging desperately to the totally bankrupt thesis that peace and disarmament are possible from a position of strength.

An opportunity was missed in Reykjavik. SDI got in the way of halting the arms race and was the chief obstacle to a nuclear-free world. But the opportunity remains. Since Reykjavik, when the world was literally a step away from what would have been historic decisions, the situation has undergone qualitative changes.

The USSR's program of new proposals opens rather than closes the door to the quest for mutually acceptable solutions. And the Soviet Union is fully resolved to achieve them by continuing contacts and talks on the entire range of questions pertaining to nuclear and space weapons on the basis of the platform we put forward in Reykjavik.

Reykjavik demonstrated that the elimination of the nuclear threat is a realistic possibility. Accords can be reached. The Soviet Union's proposals still stand. All that is needed is the political will, the conviction that mankind will win if the military complex loses.

## ABM-SDI Issue

PM271400 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Oct 86 First Edition p 4

[K. Georgiyev article: "More About Logic"]

[Text] In his 22 October speech on Soviet television, M.S. Gorbachev spoke of the campaign launched in the United States to whitewash the destructive position of the American Administration, which came to the Reykjavik meeting unprepared, with the same old baggage and, finding there was no way out and that the situation demanded clear answers, wrecked the possibility of ending the meeting with accords. As M.S. Gorbachev said, the main efforts were invested in the defense of SDI, which was put to shame in Reykjavik.

In this context I would like to dwell on some of the methods resorted to by the defenders of SDI.

For instance, in the attempt to substantiate the logic behind the position adopted on SDI by President Reagan in Reykjavik, it is stressed that in putting forward the proposal to replace the ABM Treaty with a new treaty governing the creation [sozdaniye] and deployment [razvertyvaniye] of space ABM systems, the President said such a treaty would make the number of defense systems deployed dependent on the number of ballistic missiles remaining.

If we adopt this approach as a hypothesis, according to the laws of simple logic and ordinary arithmetic it must mean that since the sides are agreed on reducing the number of all strategic arms (which, of coursel includes ballistic missiles) to zero over a 10-year period, the number of space ABM systems which it is planned to deploy at the end of the 10 years must also be zero. That all looks clear enough: Once there is no sword, there is no need for a shield.

However, it transpires that Washington follows a different logic. According to its reasoning, even given zero ballistic missiles, the United States would have the "right" to deploy "x" number of space ABM systems.

How, one wonders, can the value of this "x" be calculated in relation to zero? This is a task which clearly belongs to the category that scientists call invalid. It can hardly be resolved even by means of mathematical logic (may mathematicians forgive me).

But since the White House does not get on at all well with logic, even generally accepted logic, it decided to confuse the issue even more. Let us share with you, with the Soviet Union, representatives of the American Administration say, this mysterious "x," and then one side will have, say, "y" space systems created by SDI, while the other will also have "y" such systems.

We will let future generations of mathematicians resolve this ultra-invalid problem. M.S. Gorbachev has already replied to what lies behind the American proposal.

First, he clearly told the President that the Soviet Union does not intend in any event to copy the American SDI program -- our response to it, if matters reach the stage of practical implementation, will be effective, but asymmetrical; what precisely, time will tell.

Second, as is well known from M.S. Gorbachev's 14 October speech on Soviet television, the President was told frankly that we do not take seriously the idea of sharing SDI developments with the Soviet Union. One can hardly believe in the seriousness of that promise, when the United States will not now even share oil or dairy equipment with the Soviet Union.

It seems that the President took offense at this observation, stating that he would cancel SDI if he thought it would be impossbile to share its results.

That is expressed strongly enough. But what emerged, on investigation? When American journalists started asking presidential national security adviser Poindexter what precisely the United States will be prepared to share with the Soviet Union, his answers at once confirmed what the Soviet leader said.

Whereas the President, in speaking of his readiness to share the results of SDI work with the USSR, talked about the transfer of the "technology," "systems," and "means" of ABM defense, Poindexter, answering journalists' questions, sang an entirely differnt tune. "It is possible to envision a kind of transfer of technology," he stated, "in which both sides would not necessarily have the equipment or their control systems that could be shared" (?!).

Later, in response to the natural persistence of the journalists, who wanted him to clarify this blatantly illogical formulation, there was the following statement from Poindexter:

"That doesn't mean that we would share the technology. But one can envision arrangements where both sides would have access to some sort of a command-and-control system that would command the sensors and defensive weapons."

There were, as the saying goes, no further questions. The "dialectical" nature of the logic followed in the White House became clear to everyone -- it turned out (incidentally, it was clear to the Soviet leadership from the first, as we have seen) that "sharing" means at the same time "not sharing," and "transferring" means first "transferring who knows what," and then "transferring nothing."

That is Washington's logic for you.

## U.S. 'Lies,' SDI

LD251449 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 25 Oct 86

["Top Priority" panel discussion presented by Pavel Kuznetsov with Professors Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov of the United States of America and Canada Institute]

[Excerpts] [Kuznetsov] Today we are going to discuss Reykjavik. Never before in my life as a journalist have I seen and heard so many conflicting comments on what happened in Reykjavik, and I think we know why. In the capital of Iceland the Soviet Union and the United States were on the verge of a historic, amazing breakthrough in arms control. [passage omitted] First of all, Prof Bogdanov, could you give us your assessment of the situation in the Soviet Union and the United States concerning the aftermath of the Reykjavik summit?

[Bogdanov] You know, Pavel, first of all let me share your assessment of the situation in the United States. I'm in very close agreement with you that I never also witnessed in my life as a student of American politics such a distortion of the truth, such lies, as we're witnessing now. You know...

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] Radomir, excuse me, I didn't say distortions and lies, just so many conflicting reports.

[Bogdanov] I'm going a little bit stronger than you because that's my, you know, assessment, based on facts, that it's really lies and distortion, or whatever you like, distortions and lies. That's my very strong conviction, that we have to deal with exactly with those things. Now, it became so serious in the Soviet-American relations that the secretary general felt it necessary to point out to his Danish, to Danish prime minister, that there is such a wave of distortion of the truth that he'd come to the conclusion that in the next talks with the Americans we need have open talks, not closed talks. On closed talks we always have an insistence from the American side, and I have a suspicion -- by the way, I always have the suspicion -- that for the last years Americans are using the closedness [as heard] of the talks as a, you know, very good vehicle to use it in their own interest; distorting the truth.

There is a very basic question now: how Reykjavik will impact on the overall state of the Soviet-American relations. And my feeling is that if this wave of distortion continues, if the Soviet-American relations become really a hostage of American domestic politics, well, you know, people at the American end are not talking about the substance of the talks but they're just thinking how to look better in the eyes of the mass media and their political opponents, forgetting about the essence of the talks; forgetting about the Soviet Union. I'm afraid that may very adversely impact on the Soviet-American relations.

[Kuznetsov] So, we know that that historic agreement was not signed because of the American attachment to the SDI program, or Star Wars as it is popularly known. Now, let's look at some of the arguments being forwarded in connection with this program. First of all, No 1: I think there are a lot of people who say it is a purely defensive program, and there is nothing bad if the United States goes on building something that's purely defensive. And in his recent statement in Grand Forks, North Dakota, President Reagan compared SDI with the development of radar, which helped the British repel Nazi air attacks on London in World War II. Now, let's look at this defensive side of the story. Sergey?

[Plekhanov] Well, every informed person knows that there is no such thing as a purely defensive weapon. A weapon can be used both for defense and for offense depending on the situation, and that applies to the SDI as well.

[Kuznetsov] Let's take a look at another grand, I would say, argument in favor of SDI. It was produced on many occasions in the past. This program was described as a bargaining chip, but when the moment came to strike a deal...

[Plekhanov, interrupting] That's right.

[Kuznetsov] Where was that bargain after all? The Americans said no, and they actually, they opted for the weapons that do not yet exist and preferred them to making a deal on the nukes which they said are so theatening. I mean, I don't get it.

[Plekhanov] I don't think that the viewpoint that the SDI can be used as a bargaining chip ever had a lot of proponents in the Reagan administration. I mean, there was a group of people which favored this approach, but I think there was always a dominance on the other side, on the side of those people who wanted to use [passage indistinct]. But when the time came to bargain, even before that time came, they began stressing that they will never bargain away the SDI.

[Kuznetsov] So you mean it was one of those ploys that were used to deceive the public?

[Plekhanov] That's right, that's right, because, well, it's obvious that within the foreign policy establishment and other elite circles in the United States the view that the SDI should be used as a bargain before it is too late has a lot of supporters. I mean, this is a respectable viewpoint which commands a great deal of attention. So President Reagan had to take account of that view, but he himself is so strongly attached to the program that he is not prepared to use it as a bargain, and he is supported in that by a lot of very influential people of the administration.

[Kuznetsov] UK, suppose, my question to you, Professor Bogdanov. Well, we know that President Reagan's term expires in about 2 years. Suppose a new man assumes office and he's not going to be content with a purely defensive role of SDI. And he would want those weapons to acquire an offensive possibility. Do you exclude such a possibility?

[Bogdanov] Not at all, not at all, because the practice, the reality of American political life is such that any new president, whoever comes to the White House, they are changing everything, you know. We have witnessed that in the Soviet-American relations many times, many times In a way, in that sense, the Soviet-American relations are also a hostage of the man who is sitting in the White House. You never know what is his way of thinking. So, I fully agree with you that we cannot rely on changing people in the White House. We should rely on more solid things like treaties first of all.

[Plekhanov] I think, I have a fear, that the reason, one of reasons, why Mr Reagan could not agree to our proposal on SDI at Reykjavik -- and, by the way, we were not demanding at Reykjavik that, just forget about the SDI, we were saying: Ok, you are so attached to this idea you can continue laboratory research for 10 years...

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] And even testing confined to the laboratory.

[Plekhanov] ...Yeah, confined in the laboratory, so that was again a compromise, a bargaining idea.

[Bogdanov] Sergey, I'm sorry, not only a compromise, but we were just going along the line that was taken by the President himself. He was trying to convince us, and everybody else, that that we had to deal with a research program. Just a research program meant to find out whether it is feasible or not. What we have suggested in Reykjavik, it was just confined to that, to research, and it was not in contradiction with the President's view. So, people who say that we were trying to kill the beloved child of the President, that's another distortion. It's another twist.

[Plekhanov] I didn't finish my point, and it was that, I think that when the time came, when the President realized, and his entourage realized that yes, we've come to the point, both sides have come to the point when they agreed to eliminate nuclear weapons within 10 years they got scared.

[Kuznetsov] The strategic.

[Plekhanov] The strategic, they got scared.

[Bogdanov] And now we have proofs of that.

[Plekhanov] Yeah, they got scared, and then the SDI became the last straw. Ok, be tough on SDI to destroy the whole deal. You know, I think that there was something like that. I may be wrong, I was not there.

[Bogdanov, chuckling] I'm afraid you're not, I'm afraid you're not.

[Kuznetsov] Well, thank you, gentlemen. I'm afraid our time is up, and to conclude our programme I'd like to focus on what Mikhail Gorbachev said last Wednesday in his televised address to the nation. He called President Reagan's Star Wars program the main obstacle to achieving a world without nuclear arms. The misrepresentation of the talks in Rekjavik by the American side and the deception of the American public on SDI and the other aspects of the summit have gone so far that SDI appears to be of more value to this administration than disarmament. Such a position, Mikhail Gorbachev added, casts big doubts on the sincerely of Washington's commitment to the formula achieved last year in Geneva -- that is, that nuclear war should not and cannot be waged because it is unwinnable. So, on our future programs I suggest that we take a close look at such other issues as what's ahead for us in the arms control area, conventional weapons, the Soviet plan of international security and other issues. So goodbye until next time, a week from now on the same wavelength.

## PRAVDA Review 26 Oct

PM281205 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Oct 86 First Edition p 4

[B. Orekhov "International Review"]

[Excerpts] Political life on earth is eventful and turbulent.

The Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik remains the main topic of speeches by statesmen and politicians and commentaries by the mass news media. The world community's attention was greatly attracted by the 22 October Soviet television speech by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, devoted to this subject.

## He That Hath Ears to Hear, Let Him Hear

Let us begin, as mathematicians say, "with the opposite" and, to start with, cite a quotation from the Western press. "Ronald Reagan's actions as a politician have never been more breathtaking than in the week following Reykjavik. He presented failure as success, black as white, and incompetence as a rebuff to the Russians. According to public opinion polls, Americans are in rapture over him." This is how THE NEW YORK TIMES observer Anthony Lewis assessed his President's behavior. Really a pungent but highly accurate assessment! One feels that Lewis simply pities his compatriots who have fallen victim to a most trivial swindle undertaken by the White House. But how can an ordinary American, usually not too well versed in politics, withstand the barrage of disinformation to which he is subjected through the use of all possible and impossible methods and means of propaganda? Of course he cannot. How can he not believe the President's closest assistants and advisers, who piously close their eyes when holding forth on "the President's courage in withstanding the pressure and treachery of those Russians in Reykjavik?

Having sat down to write this review, I tried to calculate the exact number of interviews, talks, statements, and articles that have been forthcoming in the past few days from the U.S. secretary of state and his supporting group of "all the President's men" -- Regan, Poindexter, Perle, Buchanan.... I tried, but unsuccessfully.

But what are they saying? What is coming out of the mouth of the "Big Bertha" of Washington propaganda? They are heaping blame on the Russians because Reykjavik failed to produce an agreement which could have been historic in our nuclear and space age. They credit the U.S. side with submitting proposals on the reduction and complete elimination of nuclear arms. We will return to this subject a little later. But now let us look at something else -- the realistic assessment of what happened at the Reykjavik meeting, whose contents and lessons will remain for a long time to come the subject of scrupulous analysis by politicians and diplomats.

This assessment is simple: After all, the Reykjavik meeting was maybe the first occasion in many decades when mankind had progressed so far in the quest for ways to nuclear disarmament.

People of the older and middle-aged generation, who have sorted out all the postwar years in various compartments of their memory, will find nothing there even remotely resembling the contents of the Reykjavik meeting. There have been other Soviet-U.S. summit dialogues. Quite a few of them have taken place. But at no other have the sides been so close to the objective desired by mankind as they were at Hofdi house. So, what is to be done now? Wring hands because of the failure? A study of the lessons of Reykjavik would probably show that this would be pointless. One of the fundamental lessons is that, having found themselves only a few steps away from practical accord on such a difficult and vitally important problem as disarmament and the elimination of the nuclear threat, people have started understanding more deeply and more clearly the magnitude of the danger in which the world find itself and have started feeling more strongly the need for immediate solutions. But the main point is that they know that the elimination of the nuclear threat is realistic and possible. The results of Reykjavik encourage all who want a breakthrough for the better.

But Reykjavik did not only engender hopes, it also demonstrated more clearly than ever before the difficulties along the way to a nuclear-free world.

Take for example the hullabaloo that has been organized across the ocean around the results of the summit meeting. This propaganda orgy shows the extent to which circles involved with profits from the arms race are frightened by what happened at the meeting, by the real chance of disarmament which means the prospect of losing billions which are now being earned from preparations for war.

There is something else that must be said with regard to the campaign across the ocean. Its participants are trying to whitewash the stance of the U.S. Administration, which came to Reykjavik unprepared, carrying the same old baggage and, since it could not have traveled far with this baggage and since the situation demanded clear-cut answers to some most important questions, it thwarted the opportunity of completing the meeting with accords. Now the U.S. Administration is trying to convince each and everyone that the potential major success in reaching specific agreements in Reykjavik was not achieved through the Soviet side's intransigence regarding the so-called "strategic defense initiative." At the same time, they declare that it was apparently SDI which brought the Soviet Union to the summit meeting. In order to boost SDI's prestige, they compile fables about its importance for America and the Russians' fear of it. Leaving all this nonsense aside, one thing can be said with certainty: The continuation of the SDI program will involve the world in a new stage of the arms race and will destabilize the strategic situation. The frenzy with which U.S. Administration spokesmen uphold the U.S. right to implement the SDI program proves only one thing: As far as the U.S. Administration is concerned, this program is nothing but an attempt to achieve military superiority over the USSR.

Immediately following the summit meeting many people in the world correctly imagined that on his return from Iceland the U.S. President would reconsider and review his stance and would make decisions stemming logically from the results of the Soviet-U.S. meeting. But what happened in actual fact? What happened was virtually incredible and beyond the grasp of comon sense. A campaign of lies, disinformation, and juggling with facts was launched -- briefly speaking, a complete distortion of the real picture. In addition, for some incomprehensible reason which is also beyond the grasp of common sense, Washington again picked up the big stick -- it announced the expulsion of 55 Soviet Embassy and consulate staffers from the United States.

But this Neanderthal method created in the civilized world a reaction which was the exact opposite of what had been expected. Even the closest U.S. allies were amazed and dismayed. "A week ago," London's THE GUARDIAN wrote, "everyone in the administration was crowding the television screens to say how Reykjavik had for the first time produced genuine movement towards an historic arms reduction agreement. If that was true, and it seems to have been, the purpose of expelling 55 Soviet diplomats 1 week later becomes utterly incomprehensible, unless it is assumed that the U.S. National Security Council spins a roulette wheel every morning to determine policy for the day."

It has been known for a long time that there is nothing like a good tub of cold water to cool down hot heads. Such a tub was provided by the Soviet Union's countermeasure announced by a USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman 22 October, which was received with understanding and approval in the world.

But the main point is that everything that is happening in the United States gives rise to an inevitable and legitimate question: What is the present U.S. Administration really like? How is business to be done with it, what is to be expected from it in other spheres of international relations? Will there be an end to the unpredictability and irresponsibility of its actions?

In his 22 October speech on Soviet television M.S. Gorbachev, having outlined once more the essence of the Soviet proposals made at the Reykjavik summit meeting, said: "We are not withdrawing these proposals, we are not withdrawing them! Everything that has been said to substantiate and develop them remains in force."

He that hath ears to hear, let him hear.

## Administration Creating 'Fantasy'

LD270100 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1500 GMT 26 Oct 86

[From the "International Panorama" program, presented by Nikolay Shishlin]

[Text] Hello, comrades. The last week has been quite rich in political events. I have in mind the recent speech by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on television and I have in mind those negotiations taking place in various countries, in the capitals of various states — negotiations which are quite rich and intense, devoted to various matters.

At the center of these meetings and conversations, in the center of all the political discussions of the past week was, of course, Reykjavik; its results and consequences.

I must note that, on the whole, as never before in the past, the work of this meeting at Reykjavik was reported in the most detailed way. As a matter of fact, there were no secrets there which should have remained concealed from the world press and the world public. All the more amusing therefore, is the fantasy which the U.S. Administration is engaged in, engendering its own legends concerning this meeting.

According to the U.S. version, it turns out that it was, indeed, the United States and not the Soviet Union which came out with broad and generous proposals. Indeed, it seems that it was the United States which tried to bring about a historic compromise, which would have signified a break-through to a completely qualitatively new state in international relations. In fact, however, when really wide-scale solutions were, as it were, close at hand, it was the United States which wrecked the achievements of this accord with its stubborness and lack of desire to consolidate the terms of the ABM Treaty.

It is true that the Americans opted for the discussion of various issues at Reykjavik, military issues and issues connected with regional conflicts, and issues of Soviet-U.S. relations and issues of ensuring human rights. But the bases of these discussions were Soviet ideas. The Soviet proposals were the starting point of the discussion. In this connection, what the U.S. press itself is writing now is very characteristic. I would like to quote the opinion of the U.S. paper THE NEW YORK TIMES. It says this: Never before has Reagan developed such a captivating line of political activity as after Reykjavik. He passes off, the paper writes, his failure for success, black for white, and incompetence for stubborness in facing the Russians. But, of course, it is hardly correct to use such words as failure and defeat applied to such a meeting as the meeting in Reykjavik. It is too significant, too serious to operate with these simple categories.

Equally characteristic is the fact that the European Parliament sitting in Strasbourg now, appraising the work of the Reykjavik meeting, is coming to such a conclusion in its resolutions — that indeed the position of the United States has led to the fact that a historic opportunity to substantially reduce the number of intercontinental strategic missiles and eliminate all medium-range missiles has been missed.

It goes without saying that there are other points of view. This very week, in fact, in the small Scottish town of Gleneagles a group, the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, was in session. This group came out -- well, true, not unanimously -- in support of the way the United States acted in the capital of Iceland.

Well, there is little that is unexpected about this, but overall, still, a completely clear impression is being created that despite all the nuances there is a sense of recognition that Reykjavik was a break-through or, as a minimum, it signified the possibility of a break-through to really fundamental solutions which would have changed the course of international events in a better direction. It is this significance of Reykjavik which is indicated by the reaction of those who are intimidated by what happened in Reykjavik, and of those political figures who have long ago allied their political outlook and political acts with the aims of the United States and the NATO block.

## Facts Altered: Preconditions Set

PM291351 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 5

[Valentin Falin commentary: "Reykjavik: Two Weeks On"]

[Text] The meeting between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President R. Reagan in Reykjavik lasted 2 days.

And all that time was spent discussing essentially one topic -- namely, whether there will or will not be nuclear weapons in the world in the future. The joint conclusion summing up the talks was: Deep nuclear disarmament is possible; for the USSR and the United States it is feasible by the middle of the next decade; it -- that is, nuclear disarmament -- must be initiated without delay.

The 2 days of talks in Reykjavik have now produced 2 weeks of heated arguments around the legacy of Reykjavik. These arguments are not likely to die down soon. There is nothing unusual about this, since the meeting in the Icelandic capital was destined to mark a watershed in people's notions of what is thinkable and what is unthinkable. The experience of Reykjavik holds the attention of representatives of the news media. It is being discussed by political scientists, parliamentarians, ideologists, and party functionaries. The pros and cons of Reykjavik are being most thoroughly analyzed by governments and interpreted at military and scientific headquarters.

Initial attempts by certain circles to present the Soviet-American meeting even before it had opened as a "routine" event or one of "minor" importance that would pass unnoticed in the flow of events did not hoodwink anyone. Nor did the crass labels such as "failure," "impasse," or "crisis" mislead many people some time later, when it was revealed that the green light had not been given in Reykjavik to the implementation by states of a practical policy in line with the realities of the age.

It is true that the accord which was so tangibly near was not achieved. Naturally, we would have welcomed another outcome because every wasted hour in the arms race means an added threat to us, to the Americans, and to civilization in general. All this is true. However, a short circuit at the last moment does not cancel out what has been achieved.

Reykjavik is a new way of looking at things, it is a qualitatively new stage in the examination of the problems of war and peace and in tackling the task of restructuring international security on the basis of equality and good-neighborliness. After Reykjavik the peoples are better aware than ever before that there is a constructive alternative to a world armed to the teeth, to military confrontation between powers, to the policy of strength and violence.

This has been understood not just by the democratic public, not just by the millions upon millions of ordinary people whom nature has endowed with common sense. It has even been grasped by the militarist circles, whom Reagan almost gave apoplexy. And suddenly the most amazing transformations began to take place. A secret directive has even been issued prescribing how the talks in Reykjavik are to interpreted.

According to the picture drawn by certain Washington figures, it is as if the sides had swapped places. It appears that it was not the United States but the Soviet Union that arrived in the Icelandic capital empty-handed. It appears that it was not the USSR which encouraged the United States to adopt a new way of thinking, that it was not the Americans but we who thwarted the achievement of an accord when we refused to get involved in the "peace-loving" SDI program. The only thing missing to complete the lie is the claim that the proposal to hold the meeting in Reykjavik came from Washington while Moscow hesitated for a long time whether to say "yes" or "no."

People usually turn the truth inside out because they have to. And if the president and members of his administration now try several times a day to tinker with the facts and to force them into the procrustean bed of American prejudices, then there is a reason for this. What we are witnessing is essentially a political self-exposure which is very instructive in many respects. Let us dwell on the main points.

In Reykjavik the President did not get carried away with deliberations on the lines that the Soviet Union only understands the language of strength or that it was SDI that forces us to engage in "serious" talks. In face-to-face conversation the head of the administration refrained from that kind of nonsense because he knew what would follow. But as soon as he returns home, to his own surroundings, to the company of people who are intoxicated with chauvinism, it is as if he were another man. So what does the incumbent of the White House ultimately stand for? It is impossible to simultaneously favor diktat and agreement based on good will, it is impossible to simultaneously favor disarmament and U.S. exclusivity.

Let us assume that thanks to their popularity, the Soviet proposals will tempt the U.S. Administration -- how can I best express it -- to claim them as its own. The elections are just around the courner. It is necessary to look good if not heroic. This is how it has to be. Furthermore, an idea, once expressed, no longer belongs to its originators. If it helped the cause of nuclear disarmament we could cede pride of place to Washington. Why not let it be like this: It was Washington which gave birth to the military atom, let Washington kill it off. If it helps the Americans to get out of the militarist rut, so be it.

However, the problem lies elsewhere. Reykjavik is being tinkered with. Distorted, and misrepresented for a different reason. Pretexts are being sought in what came out of Reykjavik in order to continue the arms race on earth and to extend it to space. By trying to whitewash everything it has done so far in violation of its obligations under international law, the adminsitration is repudiating its own outwardly peace-loving declarations.

If U.S. military might "restored" in the eighties "forced" the Soviet Union to make concessions to the United States, then this would be a straight argument in favor of continuing the buildup of this might, of increasing the pressure in the boiler of contradictions to critical and supercritical readings. In 1950 a secretary in the Truman adminstration described this kind of exercise as "aggression in the interests of preserving peace." Peace American-style, of course. In our time the same thing is being served up as Washington's "concern" for "lasting peace and people's freedom." As divine predestination which (believe it or not, this has been said after Reykjavik) has placed the "fate of mankind's oldest dream" in the hands of the imperialist United States.

It is more likely that R. Reagan, in rebuking us for our "intransigence," is atoning for his own sins. Where did he stumble in Reykjavik, where did he go beyond what is permitted, and in front of whom is he trying to justify himself? Why is the administration correcting itself?

Agreement is principle on the elimination in two stages of all Soviet and U.S. nuclear weapons by 1996 was reached in the Icelandic capital. Under the strictest, triple verification [kontrol] -- national and supranational verification, and on-site inspection [inspektsiya na meste]. The foreign mininsters were to transform the agreement in principle into specific articles.

It took only a few hours, or at most days, for the content of the potential accord itself to become obfuscated. Some people in Washington are talking about a possible reduction in "ballistic missiles excluding bombers and cruise missiles of the different launch modes. Others are juggling with the concept of "high-speed" weapons which could perhaps be eliminated as distinct from "lower-speed systems," which are not so dangerous, as it were, because it is not difficult to "recall" them after they have been launched. Consequently the latter should not be dismantled straight away.

Furthermore, under the guise of "clarifications," preconditions are being heaped up without whose implementation nothing at all can be done in the nuclear sphere -- or, rather, there will be no reductions or limitation. These conditions will not affect the plans for arms "modernization" and buildup. You will not be wrong if you assume that the demands are addressed to the Soviet Union and formulated in such a way as to ensure that no U.S. political heads or U.S. nuclear warheads come to any harm.

So what more is expected of us? It is necessary in advance to establish an equilibrium in conventional forces. The USSR is by no means opposed to this, on the contrary. Soviet views and proposals on this account were submitted to NATO countries almost 6 months ago jointly by the socialist member countries of the Warsaw Pact. So far no response has been received.

The second precondition reads: The United States "must perceive a change in the political climate in the Soviet Union." That is a pretty old tune, is it not? Back in 1945, immediately after the first U.S. test of a nuclear device, the then U.S. Secretary of War H. Stimson demanded a "liberalization of Soviet society" as an essential precondition for establishing effective international control over nuclear weapons. That dream did not come true. In view of the emergence of new military technologies, is this perhaps another try?

The third condition stipulates that the United States must be persuaded of Soviet readiness "to conduct ideological rivalry with the West by peaceful means." That demand goes a long way back. The U.S. oligarchy launched its first massive offensive against the so-called "Red Menace" 100 years ago with the Chicago massacre. The reprisals against workers staging a peaceful demonstration laid the foundations for May Day, the day of working people's international solidarity. Subsequently, as the imperial ambitions grew, the ball got rolling. Under the banner of suppressing the "Red revolt," the United States took part in the military intervention against Soviet Russia. After World War II the U.S. ruling class for some time hatched plans for a nuclear attack on the USSR based on "ideological motives." So what do they have in mind now? Pretexts are being sought for raising to a "new level" -- I am quoting a Pentagon document -- such U.S. "special operations" as "insurgency, sabotage, and psychological warfare." Lawlessness must somehow be sanctified.

From the comments of the President and his closest collaborators we have learned a few things about the true U.S. position which was at times set forth in relatively vague terms in Reykjavik. Especially as regards SDI. So, for instance, the proposition by means of which R. Reagan tried to make his space brainchild appear more attractive, namely U.S. readiness to "share" the results of technological research into "defensive systems," is now being repudiated.

When M.S. Gorbachev brushed aside these promises as something not to be taken seriously, the President appealed: "Believe me, believe in my sincerity."

On 16 October J. Poindexter, the U.S. President's national security assistant, clarified matters. According to him, there is no intention of "sharing technical documentation." On certain preliminary conditions once again, there may be "access to a command and control system for sensors." So long as the "Russians accept the U.S. concept of SDI and cooperation is satisfactorily established at "danger reduction centers." In other words, it is possible that observers may be invited to a command center to see how the control panel lights glow at the moment when, following a program that is a mystery to outsiders, mankind's fate is settled by robots under no one's control, not even Washington's, from the moment they go into orbit.

They think in "broad terms" on the Potomac. I do not know who Washington thinks we are. Or perhaps we are searching in vain for a positive meaning in the U.S. side's thoughts? Perhaps the people across the ocean are testing our restraint and are surprised that Moscow has not yet lost its self-control?

The U.S. Administration has made up its own mind that it will observe the ABM Treaty's provisions, in a very liberal interpretation, for a further 5-7 years -- in other words, just as long as now seems sufficient to complete the preparatory stage of the deployment of space-based weapons. This is a repeat of the method worked out in detail when the U.S. Pershing and cruise missiles were brought into Europe. Do you remember it? At that time exactly 4 years were allocated for the talks with the USSR, matching the schedule for completing the construction and production of the missiles and for training service personnel.

What will be left of international law if the parties to a treaty begin inventing "exceptional circumstances" threatening "supreme interests" even before the wax sealing their signature has cooled? How is it at all possible to calculate these most "extraordinary circumstances" 10-15 years in advance? It is possible if you really want to. U.S. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger publicly questioned the expediency of the U.S. side's observance of the ABM Treaty back in June 1981. The secretary was not talking about imaginary Soviet "violations" of this treaty at that time. The tales about violations were thought up later. Weinberger was discussing scientific and technical developments whose results promised to be more valuable for the United States than the provisions of any treaty either already concluded by the Americans or conceivable in the future.

"Exceptional circumstances" developed within the United States. Without any encouragement from abroad. There was a change of people in the leadership. Ideas and policy were altered. It was treaty-breaking time.

It does not befit responsible statesmen to engage in demagoguery on the problem whose solution determines whether mankind will exist or not. "How does the defense of the United States threaten the Soviet Union or anyone else," Mr Reagan exclaims. Well, that isn't hard to answer: in the same was as the U.S. postwar strategy threatened us and many others, despite the fact that every president presented it as "defensive." Without exception every type of aggression prepared by Washington -- beginning with the "experimental" "Pincer" plan and ending with the "Dropshot" program, which went into great detail -- was passed off as a "deterrent." Just like the "Army XXI" plan and the plan for vertical and horizontal escalation with which the United States intended to enter the third millennium.

In his recent speech M.S. Gorbachev cited a number of extracts from the "1984-1988 Defense Guidance," on whose basis the modernization of the U.S. Armed Forces is now being carried out.

The aims of the measures now being implemented by the administration in the military sphere are given in the "Guidance as attaining military "superiority" and enabling the U.S. Armed Forces to prevail over the Soviet Armed Forces in either a brief or a protracted war. And not simply to prevail but to "destroy the entire structure of the military and political power of the Soviet Union and its allies" and to guarantee to "inflict very great damage on Soviet industry."

In the approach to the battles of the future, the "Guidance instructs that economic, technological, and trade warfare be waged against the USSR and that "excessive expenditure" be imposed on us, involving more and more new spheres of the arms race and creating weapon systems and military technologies, including space-based ones, which will make all previous Soviet defense spending look small. Then, hiding behind a "space shield" for all occasions, the United States will try to dictate to the world what it either lacked the time or the ability to dictate in the era of its atomic monopoly. The "Guidance" is a document for internal use. No cosmetic epithets of the "defensive" kind are used. So as not to distract those who are supposed to give U.S. militarism its destructive brilliance.

A well-known 17th century French thinker once remarked: "Most people spend the best time of their lives making the worst time even more miserable." In Reykjavik the U.S. President was presented with a historic opportunity to disprove that rule. He missed his chance. On returning from the Icelandic capital, the President preferred not to reduce armaments but instead to engage in reducing the number of staff at the respective embassies in Washington and Moscow.

Reykjavik has not ended. It is going on. The ideas expressed there have won the peoples' approval. This makes it possible to look to the future with optimism.

## Russian Patriarch Comments

LD290007 Moscow TASS in English 1850 GMT 28 Oct 86

[Text] **Moscow October 28 TASS -- "The clergy and the laymen of the Russian Orthodox Church are inspired by the fact that the leadership of the Soviet Union consistently strives for the creation of conditions to ensure the basic right of every person: the right to life," says a message sent by Patriarch Pimen of Moscow and all Russia to Mikhail Gorbachev.**

**"We share your statement** that cessation of the build-up of nuclear and other weapons of **mass destruction,** their complete elimination from the face of the earth, and the **prevention of militarisation** of outer space are the most reliable guarantee of that," **Patriarch Pimen writes.**

**"We profoundly regret that not all mighty powers realize their particular responsibility for the future of mankind. It was precisely this tragic circumstance that told on the recent meeting in the capital of Iceland between you and U.S. President Mr Ronald Reagan."**

"We welcome the Soviet side's stand in Reykjavik, the stand which is open to accords and which takes into account the interests of the two countries, their allies and all peoples in the world. This stand becomes a vivid manifestation of a new political thinking and new approach to the urgent problems of our times, the need for which you spoke of at the talks."

**"We are aware with bitterness** that the U.S. side's unrealistic approach to a number of **matters under discussion,** the approach that was dangerous to peace did not make it **possible to conclude the meeting** with decisions capable of ridding the world of the **nastiness of nuclear weapons as early as in the coming** decade. Thereby the hopes, **which all people of goodwill were entertaining** in those days, for a favourable outcome **of the talks did not come** true."

**"Nevertheless, we,** the children of the Russian Orthodox Church, just like all Soviet **people are inspired** by the optimism with which you look into the future."

**The message says that** the church people of the Land of the Soviets will do everything **depending on them** "to bring nearer the advent of a world without nuclear weapons, a **world with peaceful skies** and full of fraternal cooperation among all peoples."

## U.S. 'Distorting,' 'Backtracking'

LD282000 Moscow TASS in English 1917 GMT 28 Oct 86

["Washington Backtracking in High Gear"--TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow October 28 TASS--TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshev writes:

Washington goes ahead with its attempts at distorting the accords reached between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik.

On October 27 White House Deputy Press Secretary Larry Speakes stated that the elimination of ballistic missiles had been discussed in Reykjavik. He maintained that the U.S. delegation had rejected the USSR's proposal to eliminate all strategic offensive arms within a decade.

Such an interpretation does not conform to reality. In actual fact the U.S. President when discussing the issue agreed with the argumentation of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in favour of a radical solution to the problem of strategic arms, a solution which would not leave other dangerous types of nuclear arms -- besides ballistic missiles -- outside the elimination framework.

Neither did Ronald Reagan object to eliminating all nuclear explosive devices by the end of two five-year periods.

In so doing the President expressed the idea that if there was consent to eliminate all nuclear arms, it was possible to turn this accord over to the delegations in Geneva.

It was the U.S. side's consent to such a radical solution to the nuclear arms problem that made it possible to reach a mutually acceptable accord on strategic offensive arms in Reykjavik.

That the sides were close to concluding an agreement on a ban on all strategic weapons was reaffirmed by U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz at a press conference in Reykjavik at the close of the meeting and then at a briefing for the members of Congress in the White House on October 14.

According to a report in THE NEW YORK TIMES newspaper dated October 28, U.S. officials have recognized that the President "agreed, at least preliminarily that an overall arms accord could include a ban on all offensive strategic arms".

The U.S. President himself in his speech on October 16 stated straightforwardly: "Mr Gorbachev and I were able to come closer to finding the magic formula which would permit us to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in our respective arsenals, even eliminate them entirely".

Washington is now backing out, trying to dissociate itself from what happened in Reykjavik. With this end in view it refers to U.S. positions which were virtually interim ones during the discussion or simply make up every kind of stories.

People in Washington are stating, for example, that the President promised to reduce all strategic forces by 50 per cent over the first five-year period, and to cut down ballistic missiles in subsequent five years, leaving strategic bombers and cruise missiles on them intact.

Mr. Speakes, in general, went to the lengths of stating that it was only ballistic missiles that had been discussed.

Who needed to 'adjust' the President's stand after the event? Apparently, those circles which are obviously frightened by the process started in Reykjavik and seek to create such conditions in which the process could be drowned.

The Soviet Union's consent to agree to the version which is now being publicized in the USA would mean to abandon the principle of equality and equal security.

According to U.S. Under-Secretary of Defence Fred Ikle, the United States would be in a somewhat better position as compared with the USSR if ballistic missiles are eliminated by both sides.

He said the strategic balance would revert to the days of the early sixties. Figures to 'substantiate' that have been provided by specialists from the Rand Corporation who have estimated that the USA has a three to one numerical advantage in cruise missiles and strategic bombers.

The explanation turns out to be quite simple: an endeavour to ensure U.S. superiority is seen in this issue as well.

## Confirmations in U.S. Press

LD281513 Moscow TASS in English 1429 GMT 28 Oct 86

[Text] New York October 28 TASS -- The U.S. press is forced to admit that the Washington administration had presented in a distorted light what really happened at the Soviet-American meeting at Reykjavik.

THE NEW YORK TIMES quoted a high ranking White House official as saying that he would not deny the Soviet Union's statement that President Reagan had approved of the proposal by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that all strategic offensive weapons, and not only ballistic missiles, be eliminated by the year of 1996. As is known, in recent days, the U.S. mass media began, on a tip-off from the White House, spreading inventions that President Reagan had only taken note of the USSR's stand providing for the total elimination of strategic offensive weapons by the end of the ten-year period.

THE NEW YORK TIMES recalls among other things that U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz has from the very outset reaffirmed the statements by the Soviet Union. In their first statement at the press conference in Reykjavik after the closing of the meeting and then on October 14 at a briefing for Congress members in the White House, he said that the sides were close to concluding an agreement prohibiting all strategic weapons, the newspaper stressed.

The newspaper also refers to Senator Sam Nunn, who was present at the briefing given by George Shultz and then at a meeting with President Reagan. The senator recalled that in answer to his question whether the President had accepted Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal on the total destruction of the strategic offensive weapons by 1996, Reagan nodded affirmatively, the senator recalls.

## 'Success' Needed for Senate

LD281419 Moscow in English to North America 0001 GMT 28 Oct 86

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] A dispute continues in the United States over what precisely the American side agreed to at the Reykjavik summit earlier this month. It all began on 12 October, the second and final day of the summit when Secretary of State George Shultz told a national television audience that he was deeply disappointed by the summit failure. But by Monday, top administration officials and the President himself were talking about breakthroughs and sweeping potential agreements. It's believed that President Reagan could not afford coming back home with anything short of a success to be able to campaign with some kind of vigor to retain the Senate in Republican hands.

Reykjavik was indeed a big step forward as it enabled the two countries to come within reach of a historical agreement which could have paved the way to a world without nuclear arms. Unfortunately this did not happen. Why? The American attachment to the SDI program made it impossible to set out on the road of eliminating the nukes. Obviously this is a bad thing to tell the American public. Claiming to be the authors of the Soviet proposal, United States officials began a misinformation campaign which has come to a point when even few of those who did take part in the Reykjavik talks seem to know what they are talking about.

Did the American President agree to the elimination of all nuclear arms by 1996 or only of strategic offensive weapons, or did he want to eliminate all ballistic missiles, leaving aside strategic bombers and cruise missiles?

To set the record straight the Soviet Foreign Ministry held a briefing for local and foreign reporters on Saturday at which its spokesman, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, quoted President Reagan as telling Mikhail Gorbachev: If we agree that by the end of the 10-year period all nuclear arms are to be eliminated we can refer this to our delegations in Geneva to prepare an agreement that you could sign during your visit to the United States.

It is precisely this American position revealing a sense of responsibility which made it possible for both sides to arrive at a common understanding on what to do with strategic offensive arms. Speaking last Wednesday on Soviet television, Mikhail Gorbachev pointed out that the President had consented, albeit without special enthusiasm, to the elimination of all strategic offensive arms in two stages over the 10-year period. The current dispute over what the U.S. President said and what he did not say looks like there's an effort to revise the outcome of the Reykjavik summit on this crucial issue.

## Summit Documents Published

PM301109 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Oct 86 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "For the Sake of Peace on the Planet"]

[Text] An anthology entitled "The Soviet-U.S. Summit Meeting" [Sovetsko-Amerikanskaya Vstrecha na Vysshem Urovne] has been published. It contains materials on the 11-12 October 1986 meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan in Reykjavik, a report on M.S. Gorbachev's press conference, the 14 and 22 October speeches by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee on Soviet Television, and other documents.

The anthology has been published by the Political Literature Publishing House.

## SDI Concession 'Impossible'

PM031637 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 29 Oct 86 First Edition p 5

[Mikhail Ozerov article under the rubric "Opinions and Doubts": "On 'Superlove' of SDI"]

[Text] "I listened with tremendous attention to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statements after Reykjavik and read them in the newspaper, but one point is not clear to me. Reagan said several years ago that he would not take a single step back from his beloved SDI. Since we made so many compromises in Iceland, perhaps it was worth making one more and not focusing attention on the 'Star Wars' program?"

This question was put to me when I was speaking about my trip to Reykjavik at the Cinematographers' Union. And it at once occurred to me: Some readers of our newspaper ask about the same thing. I will cite just one statement -- by Mariya Olegovna Stefashina, a doctor from Kirov -- which , it is true, is most categorical: "Shouldn't we have just backed down on the issue of SDI? For if documents had been signed in Iceland on some things at least, the situation would have improved, and not vice versa."

Questions associated with SDI rained down on us Soviet journalists literally like a squall even back in Reykjavik. After Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's press conference, which, as everyone remembers, ended late in the evening, the Icelandic capital had no thought of sleep. All four press centers were particularly busy: Soviet, American, Icelandic, and international. Heated debates and arguments were developing everywhere, and a great many of them were linked in one way or another with the American "Strategic Defence Initiative" -- SDI.

At that time we explained the Soviet position in detail. Today, after new statements by our party leader, it has become still clearer.

No, Mariya Olegovna, in Reykjavik it was impossible to reach agreement "on some things" without touching on SDI. And this is why. You have undoubtedly noticed how frequently the word "package" features in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's recent statements. This is no coincidence. We have proposed not arms. And a package is a balance of interests, mutual concessions, and compromises which are very closely linked with each other and constitute a practically unified whole. Judge for yourselves: Is it really possible to open and close a door simultaneously? In just the same way you cannot limit the arms race and, at the same time, create [sozdavat] new, fundamentally new types of weapons. Remember M.S. Gorbachev's words, which we heard on television on 22 October: "With knowledge of the problem, I can now say just one thing: The continuation of the SDI program will drag the world into a new stage of the arms race and destabilize the strategic situation."

This, incidentally, is the answer to you regarding the internatioinal situation. Would it really improve if, having eliminated nuclear weapons, the world acquired in return a threat from space?

Now about another aspect. Indeed, back in early 1983, when the American "Star Wars" program was announced, Ronald Reagan began beating his breast: he would never abandon it, he said. But does that mean that we should accept his idea? We take the directly opposite approach to what space should be like. So why should we sit with arms folded and wait for the sky to become an arena for deadly nuclear skirmishes?

We have never acted in that way. Nor do we intend to do so. This was why the Soviet side raised this problem in Reykjavik and did so firmly and decisively.

Nor will I conceal another fact. We had hoped that the shoots of realism and the new thinking, which are now absolutely essential, would at last begin to sprout on American soil. Surely reason cannot sleep forever in the White House, can it?

Our hopes of securing major agreements in Iceland were also founded on the fact that the Soviet Union was ready to make very great concessions. It was ready to make them and did so.

But these, as we know, did not follow. Nor did realism make its presence felt either. it was precisely the President's reluctance to abandon his chief gamble on "Star Wars" that prevented our countries from making great progress on a wide range of nuclear disarmament issues.

It is not a matter here of Reagan's "superlove" of SDI. Nor of the fact that he considers it a "panacea against war," an "insurance policy for America," and so forth. The Western press is now full of statements of this type, and all kinds of radio voices are vigorously trying to impose them on their listeners.

There are also more than enough quotations debunking these myths, and our readers undoubtedly know of them. Therefore I will cite just one -- from the American newspaper NEWSDAY: "If Moscow removes its missiles, and Reagan also apparently advocates this, why is SDI needed?"

Why? The answer is clear. True disarmament is like a thorn in the side of the President, his entourage, and the omnipotent military monopolists. They have pursued and are continuing to pursue a line of militant anticommunism. Of course, this is a sad conclusion, but it is the one you draw on observing and analyzing the Americans' position in Reykjavik and also at the present time.

Now the last point. To rid the world of fear of the future, we must not arm together but disarm together. Only in this way, and certainly not with the help of the notorious SDI, can genuine security be achieved. Therefore there can be just one answer to the question "Shouldn't we back down?": No way.

## Reagan 'Orchestrating' Propaganda

LD291943 Moscow TASS in English 1756 GMT 29 Oct 86

["Campaign of Disinformation About Reykjavik Criticized" -- TASS take identifier]

[Text] New York October 29 TASS -- U.S. President Ronald Reagan continues orchestrating a propaganda campaign with the aim of justifying the U.S. course toward acquiring unilateral military superiority over the Soviet Union -- the course that torpedoed accord on arms control at the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik.

Addressing Republican preelection rallies in Georgia and Alabama, the President described the core of the militarist U.S. policy -- the "Strategic Defense Initiative" -- as a "special accomplishment" of his administration.

Openly speculating on the striving of the Americans for peace, he maintained that the decision to go ahead with the SDI program had "brought the Soviet Union to the bargaining table."

The President reiterated his deep commitment to the "Star Wars" program which he described as "America's insurance policy."

Stubborn efforts of the U.S. President to pass off black as white and to provide a distorted picture of the talks in Reykjavik, cannot mislead sober-minded Americans.

More and more U.S. citizens are arriving at the conclusion that the current Washington administration is motivated by the striving for military superiority through the militarization of outer space, and not by the concern for peace and the future of human civilization.

"The fact remains that Mr. Reagan turned his back on the greatest opportunity any president has ever had to reverse the direction of the nuclear arms race and to nail down major mutual reductions in nuclear weaponry," John Oakes, a former senior editor of THE NEW YORK TIMES, wrote in that paper. "American people reject the fantasies of the Strategic Defense Initiative and want to get on with the unfinished business that was left on the table at Reykjavik."

## Contradictory Accounts

PM311019 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Oct 86 First Edition p 5

[Unattributed "Verbatim" report: "At Sixes and Sevens"]

[Text] UPI: As Assistant Secretary of Defense Perle, one of the participants in the talks at the Reykjavik summit, said on 27 October, Reagan "did not go along with" Soviet leader Gorbachev's proposal on eliminating all strategic nuclear armaments and "there was no discussion of the question of how to define strategic armaments."

"The President did not say this, but the Russians are trying to create the impression that he did," Perle said in an interview. "I think the Russians would have people believe that something was agreed on in Reykjavik which was not in fact agreed on."

THE NEW YORK TIMES: A senior White House official stated on 27 October that he "would not argue" with a Soviet claim that President Reagan accepted Gorbachev's proposal on banning all strategic offensive forces, and not just ballistic missiles, by 1996...

The aforementioned White House official, who supports the President and was talking on condition that his name would not be mentioned, for the first time indicated the possibility that Reagan had disregarded his advisers' concern about the dangers of agreeing to an all-embracing ban on all strategic offensive forces or long-range offensive forces.

The advisers warned that the ban should be limited to ballistic missiles so that the Soviet Union would be unable to exploit its superiority in conventional forces.

It was the latest and clearest of a number of admissions by the White House that the Soviet side is interpreting Reagan's words more or less correctly....

In addition to the pronouncements by the aforementioned White House official, other officials admit that the content of the talks corresponds by and large to the Soviet claim that President Reagan agreed, at least on a preliminary basis, that a general agreement on arms could incorporate a ban on all strategic offensive arms.

But officially the White House refused to comment on Reagan's words. It was still maintaining that in the sense of official proposals the United States only proposed a 50 percent reduction of strategic forces and the elimination of all types of offensive ballistic missiles by the end of a 10-year period.

The matter is complicated by the fact that Secretary of State Shultz, who joined Reagan in the final conversations with Gorbachev, provided evidence from the outset confirming the Soviet version.

In his first reports Shultz stated that the two sides were close to an agreement on banning all strategic weapons. He said this at the post-meeting press conference in Reykjavik and on 14 October at a White House briefing for members of Congress.

In connection with the broader possibility of ridding the world of all nuclear armaments, including medium-range, close-range, and battlefield weapons, according to the Soviet version, Reagan said: "If we agree to eliminate all nuclear armaments by the end of a 10-year period, we can communicate this accord to our delegations in Geneva for them to prepare a treaty which you would be able to sign during your visit to the United States."

Without disputing this quotation, the aforementioned White House official said that "nothing came" of this.

## U.S. Policy 'Zig-Zags'

LD301603 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1505 GMT 30 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow, 30 Oct -- Leonid Ponomarev, a TASS commentator, writes:

Thoroughly entangled in their own versions of the American stance at the Reykjavik meeting, representatives of the U.S. Administration have, it would seem, been unable to find anything better than to fall back on their old proposals for arms verification [kontrol], in this way taking a leap backwards. Appearing in Rapid City, South Dakota, the chief of the White House declared that the proposals he had taken to Reykjavik "remain on the negotiating table" for talks with the Soviet Union, and the United States is prepared to start discussing them. And to discuss them "from a position of strength," which is ensured for Washington, supposedly, by the Star Wars program.

In this connection it would be worth recalling the baggage that the Americans brought to the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik. Not a single new thought, not a single fresh approach, not a single idea that promised even a hint of an outcome or any movement forward. However, even this did not dishearten the Soviet side.

Nevertheless, following lengthy debates they managed to reach an understanding on the matter of ways to reduce the two sides' triad of strategic offensive weapons.

This means the ground-based missiles, strategic submarines, and strategic bombers. It was only the U.S. unwillingness to limit research, development, and testing [issledovaniye, razrabotka, i ispytaniye] of SDI to the laboratory, and the U.S. desire to break into space with weapons, that brought the whole process of rapprochement to a standstill. Now the Washington administration is making what amounts to dizzying pirouettes on its policies, in order to create a semblance of readiness to come to agreement with the USSR. In the sphere of strategic weapons, for example, the U.S. leaders have separated strategic ballistic missiles from everything, and are making statements about consent to "come to an understanding" about reductions of them and even total elimination of them over 10 years. Meanwhile, they would still like to leave themselves the strategic bombers and cruise missiles, of which the United States has more.

In fact, administration officials admitted at Reykjavik that at the Soviet-U.S. meeting the sides "were close" to an agreement on prohibiting all, let us emphasize, all strategic weapons in a stated 10-year period. Now they are talking only about ballistic missiles.

To add to it all, as becomes clear from articles in the American press, Washington is demanding a separate solution to the question of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe. Can these zig-zags, this kind of jumping from side to side, really be called a serious policy? Of course not. Even the American press cannot recall responsible governments changing their position with this kind of ease.

For our part, we can state that the Soviet side has left on the negotiating table all those of its proposals that were spelled out at Reykjavik in complete sincerity and in a completely direct manner. The Soviet Union has invested a maximum of goodwill in them. But accords are possible only given the same kind of goodwill and sincerity on the other side. Meanwhile Washington is displaying neither the one nor the other.

## Reagan Speech 'Crude Deception'

LD312248 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1430 GMT 31 Oct 86

[Text] U.S. President Reagan is now coming to the end of his visit to a number of states throughout the country urging Americans to vote at the forthcoming congressional elections for Republican Party candidates. During the visit the President has been making statements, among other things about his administration's foreign policy, and in particular about the further action it will be taking in light of the results of the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik. Here is our commentator, Andrey Ptashnikov:

[Ptashnikov] The White House chief made his latest stopover in Rapid City, South Dakota. As the VISNEWS agency reported, he said in his speech to the electorate that the proposals submitted by the United States in Reykjavik remain in force, and that the United States is ready to confirm the accords reached in Iceland and to continue its work on the basis of those accords. The President also expressed the hope that the USSR would join the U.S. efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear war.

And now, comrade listeners, imagine yourselves in the place of those Americans listening to the President. You will get the impression for sure that it was the United States which did everything it could to ensure that the talks in the Icelandic capital would end successfully, and that it was none other than the White House chief who submitted there important, constructive proposals to reduce strategic offensive weapons and eliminate Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe; and if no weighty agreements in the sphere of disarmament were signed at the Reykjavik meeting, then this was completely the fault of the Soviet Union. So that's the picture -- no more, and no less. But if you consider that exactly the same picture is also being drawn day in, day out by the United States mass media, then there is nothing surprising in the fact that certain Americans are in a state of confusion.

Why is all this being done? Why is official Washington going in for this direct and crude deception of the public? First and foremost in order to mislead ordinary Americans and to try and convince them of the current administration's love of peace, and by this means to gain their support for the ruling Republican Party at the forthcoming congressional elections. The second aim is, by means of disinformation, to justify the White House's own aggressive militarist course.

Speaking on Soviet television, Comrade Gorbachev stressed that there had started in the United States a bustling campaign to call other people's proposals their own. The past few days have shown how something of great importance is being drowned in petty intrigues. More than a week has passed since Comrade Gorbachev spoke, but events are showing that, regrettably, during that time in official Washington nothing has in fact changed.

## Radio Talk Show 1 Nov

LD011502 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 1 Nov 86

["Top Priority" weekly current events program with moderator Vladimir Pozner; Professors Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov of Moscow's United States of America and Canada Institute]

[Text] [Pozner] How do you do, ladies and gentlemen. This is Vladimir Pozner presenting "Top Priority." With me, as usual, are professors Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov of Moscow's USA and Canada Studies Institute. Today we're going to take a look at a post-Reykjavik period, basically what is being said in Washington -- in official Washington -- about what actually happened in Iceland. Now, as you know, initially Mr Shultz said that the meeting in Iceland is a failure; then, when everyone arrived, he said that this was due to his having been tired, actually that it was a great success. We've heard the President say that he agreed to one thing, Mr Shultz saying that he agreed to another thing, Mr Poindexter saying something else. I would like you, as two experts, first of all to categorize, if possible, exactly what is being said and why it's being said.

[Bogdanov] I would prefer to talk about why than about what because, you know, they have said so many things over there that I'm really puzzled how to categorize all that, because such a confusion, such a distortion of the truth and -- if you like -- such a wave of disinformation, misinterpretation, is there that, really my difficulty is that how to categorize, and I'm not sure, I'm not sure, Vladimir, that that is our task today, to categorize. You have done it already. You have made a difference between the post-Reykjavik period, immediate post-Reykjavik period, and what's going on now. My problem is why, why. And I believe that in that case we have, as usual, it was in the history of the Soviet-American relations, that those relations are becoming a hostage of the domestic American politics. So, first of all, they (?thought) how to pacify their own people; and, number two, how to impact on the elections. And when they touched American soil they have forgotten about the substance of Reykjavik. That's my impression.

There is another factor which I would like to call your attention to, [that] is the situation within the administration. I have an impression that after Reykjavik you have very, you know, major division within the ranks of the administration, and when I talk about the administration I mean different, you know echelons of that administration. There is a difference, my feeling is, between highest level of the administration at the White House and between middle level, if you like.

[Pozner] What do you mean by that?

[Bogdanov] I mean by that, for instance, you have on the table what the President has said and you have on the table what people like Richard Perle, assistant, just an assistant of the secretary of defense for the international security [has said] and you will be amazed what is the difference between the boss and what is the difference between this guy, you know. My impression is that what I have read in the American press and what I've heard over the radio that this guy is trying to teach the President, that he is putting into the President's mouth the things which he's never said. Does it mean that, you know, he's trying to follow on his own line? Maybe, but in any case it shows that there is a division within the administration.

[Pozner] Yes, well let me, let me take you up on this Richard Perle business. I personally heard Richard Perle on "Nightline", I believe it was "Nightline" -- at any rate I heard and I saw him on television saying that the main reason why there had been no agreement at Reykjavik was because the Soviets insisted, says Richard Perle, that SDI must be limited to the laboratory forever. I'm quoting him: forever — although we know that the Soviet Union said for 10 years.

[Bogdanov] the President, by the way, the President also said for 10 years.

[Pozner] Exactly. So what you have here is, you have Perle saying one thing and the President, we know, having said something else, and the Soviets repeating what they said, number one. Number two: In the area of strategic offensive weapons, at Reykjavik it was clearly stated that we are talking about all strategic offensive weapons. The Americans are now trying to make it seem as if the President was talking only about ballistic missiles, not including heavy bombers and cruise missiles.

[Plekhanov briefly interrupts -- unintelligible]

[Bogdanov] I'm sorry, before you start, Sergey, I would make a distinction between Americans and some Americans because some Americans are not contesting our ...

[Plekhanov, interrupting] Well, I think that the line that the President didn't mean elimination of all strategic weapons within 10 years, that line, I think, has by and large been dropped by the administration because there have been several admissions from top officials in the administration that, yes, the President did talk about that. The line now from the White House is that there was no agreement on it, nothing formal. But yes, the President did talk and, in fact, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh quoted in precise terms what the President said. The interesting thing is that the quote from the President referred not only to strategic offensive weapons, but all nuclear weapons. He said something like: Well, if we agree on the elimination of all nuclear weapons within 20 years then we can make the instructions to the negotiating teams and we can sign the treaty when Mr Gorbachev visits the United States.

So I think that has pretty well been established that the President did agree to the idea of eliminating all nuclear weapons within 10 years.

[Pozner] May I ask this question? If what we are hearing, if the signals that we're getting from the United States are interpreted the way we are interpreting them, then it means that at Geneva the Americans are going to make a proposal that is not going to include heavy bombers. What does that mean?

[Bogdanov] You know, Vladimir, we, we are now at the very peculiar, you know, situation. Before we talk about Geneva talks we should come to the common agreement what we are talking about, because there is a substantial difference between two sides. One side says that we were talking about eliminating all nuclear weapons, strategic offensive, and the other side says no we were talking only about ballistic missiles. Now you have two teams at Geneva. What are on the table, that's my question. I have no answer, I have no answer.

[Pozner] What is it that we would not in your opinion, and in my opinion certainly, agree to only ballistic missiles?

[Bogdanov] You know, because it, first of all, it doesn't solve the problem, because you deal with the ballistic missiles but you still have bombers, strategic bombers, and you have cruise missiles, and in that category of weaponry American side has some advantage over the Soviet Union. The trick is that you deal with the ballistic missiles and you put aside the part in which the American side has all the advantages, you know, which is not just unfair, it's not honest, you know, it's not honest, and that's why I come back to what I have already said. This administration is trying again to demonstrate how tough we are with those Russians, how we deal with them.

By the way, after first Geneva summit at the end of the last year when all of us, we had hopes that the Soviet-American relations will be going on, on upwards, you know, we had the same (?dealing) you know, maneuvers of this administration. They were scared, that's my feeling, by the criticism from the far right that they were selling out America just because the President started talking to Russians about disarmament. Then the President had to confirm his credentials with these far right people, killing by that, you know, killing by that the normal, the process of normalization of the Soviet-American relations. And instead of improvement we had going, we had a process of the downgrading the Soviet-American relations after Geneva summit. By the way, one of the reasons, maybe the main reason, why we had to have Reykjavik just to stop that process was that we were moving into very dangerous, you know, situation in the Soviet-American relations.

[Pozner] I'd like to ask you something, Dr. Plekhanov. As we've said, when the American delegation came back to the United States and started talking about the great success of Reykjavik as differing from what they said right after General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan had their last meeting, and when they began talking about what had actually been agreed to in a preliminary fashion, that is to say the elimination of all strategic offensive nuclear weapons, this they denied, speaking only about ballistic weapons. Do you think that perhaps one of the reasons they did that was because if the American people were told directly that there was a possibility to agree on the abolition of all offensive strategic nuclear weapons, and that the only reason that this didn't happen was because the President or his people refused to concede even a little bit (?so that) SDI be 10 years in laboratory, the American people would be upset? Don't you think that that's part of the...

[Plekhanov, interrupting] Exactly. I think you put your finger on it because they are afraid, very much afraid of the SDI being focused on as the major reason why we haven't been able to use the chance that we had, both sides, and as a result they are saying no, no, no, it's not just the SDI, it's all those differences within each category of the talks; there are many details which need to be worked out, so they want to take the fire off the SDI. And another tactic which they're using now is to emphasize that the SDI is a good thing for the talks because they say: Well, it was the SDI that really compelled the Russians to make all those concessions, and as a result how can we give it away because if we really, you know -- we're on the right track. The SDI helps us to extract from the Russians those concessions, so let's keep it in order to get further concessions. But nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, the SDI has created a very dangerous crisis-ridden situation in Soviet-American relations, and saying that it was the SDI that helped create a new situation at the talks is like saying, you know, we must thank the people who makes fires for the improvement of the fire equipment. Something like that. Good people, I mean...

[Pozner, interrupting] As we wind up, I would like to ask you this. I think it can be said that the American people have been subjected to a blitz campaign of disinformation -- really, that's how I see it -- and that campaign seems to have been at this point rather successful. We will see, but at this point it seems to be successful, and I look back on those famous words that were spoken by Abraham Lincoln about the possibility of being able to fool some of the peole most of the time and most of the people some of the time, but you can't, said he, fool all of the people all of the time. Now, with that in mind, what do you think? How long is it going to take before finally the truth becomes apparent to the American people. Do you think that this is going to go on for a long time? What's your prediction?

[Bogdanov] You know, I'm a little bit pessimistic really because the problem is that not a bit of truth of what happened in Reykjavik reached American public opinion. And all these opinion polls, you know, they were not correct by each definition, by the formulation of the questions, by the main major reason, because American public opinion was not informed about the substance of the Soviet proposls, what they were all about, you know. That's my worry. Now you have a wall, a big wall, a very fat wall of disinformation on the way, on the way of our, you know, proposals reaching American public opinion. How to deal with that, I don't know. Really, I have no answer.

[Pozner] What do you say, what do you say, Dr Plekhanov?

[Plekhanov] I think that there is a clear asymmetry on both sides of the equation now as to how public opinion is reacting to Reykjavik. I think in this country we are witnessing an unusual upsurge of interest in the substance of the arms control issue. There is a lot of discussion at all levels in society, rallies, a lot of television programs, newspaper articles which discuss the issue. And the public is really concerned, really involved. I am not sure that the same thing is happening in the United States, where the public really has not, most, the majority of the public, despite the fact that, yes, there were reports in the newspapers, and yes there were some television programs -- and I heard the other day that the CNN ran the full coverage of Secretary Gorbachev's news conference -- but those are just drops in the bucket, because it's not just the ability to turn on your TV set and listen to something, it's the attention, the coverage which comes from the opinion makers, and the opinion makers are not interested, the American opinion makers are not interested in the truth about Reykjavik penetrating the depth of the American mind. They want to shunt it aside, they want people to forget about it.

[Pozner] Dr Plekhanov, Dr Bogdanov, I thank you very much, and for "Top Priority" this is Vladimir Pozner inviting you to join us a week from today at the same time.

## Shultz San Francisco Speech Hit

PM031315 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Nov 86 First Edition p 5

["Shultz Against Shultz" -- PRAVDA headline]

[Text] San Francisco November 1 TASS -- Nowadays high-ranking Washington officials who are trying to distort the results of the meeting in Reykjavik wind up in an unenviable position of someone trying to renounce their own words. And the latest example of that is the address made by U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz before the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco.

The remarks made by the head of the U.S. foreign affairs department, as he was trying to justify the administration's stand of reneging on the accords reached in Reykjavik, were in contradiction with his own earlier statements.

For instance, he maintained that during the Reykjavik meeting the American President had allegedly agreed only to the proposal to eliminate intercontinental ballistic missiles. [Moscow TASS in English at 1424 GMT on 1 November in its version of the report on Shultz' remarks here inserts the following: "The President proposed to eliminate over time all ballistic missiles, Shultz said addressing the Commonwealth Club."]

However, suffice it to recall the news conference given by none other than the U.S. secretary of state right after the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik to see a clear distortion of facts.

During that news briefing Shultz said that during the talks an agreement had been reached in principle on the elimination of "all offensive strategic arms and ballistic missiles" over a 10-year period. These are known to include the intercontinental ballistic misiles, the bombers with nuclear weapons on board and the submarines armed with nuclear missiles.

It is also appropriate to recall that, in the words of Senator Sam Nunn, in a conversation with him right after Reykjavik President Reagan admitted that the U.S. side at the meeting had agreed to eliminate all strategic offensive arms over a period of 10 years.

"The Soviet Union," THE NEW YORK TIMES wrote in its comment on the matter, "produced quotations from Reagan's statements at Reykjavik that made nonsense of all the White House denials. By changing their accounts of what happened at Reykjavik, U.S. officials have undermined confidence in their version."

The purpose of the allegations that the President "was misunderstood" is simple -- to block off possible progress in the arms limitation field on the basis of what was achieved in Reykjavik and at the same time to shift the blame on the Soviet Union, leaving Washington's dangerous plans for the militarization of outer space above criticism.

Meanwhile, it is known that the notorious "Strategic Defense Initiative" was the main obstacle on the road to a successful completion of the meeting.

In his San Francisco address the U.S. secretary tried -- clearly with an eye to the mid-term congressional election to be held November 4 -- to reassure the American public, by saying that at the present both sides were allegedly moving toward an agreement. "For the first time in the long history of talks, a genuine possibility of substantial reductions in Soviet and American nuclear arms appeared," he said.

Yes, such a possibility indeed appeared, but it is no other than the American Adminstration that is actively hindering its realization, by falsifying the substance of the talks in Reykjavik.

The stubborness with which the White House is forging ahead with the adventurous "Star Wars" program and trying to undermine the ABM Treaty confirms that the U.S. Administration is not striving to "start in Geneva with what was achieved in Reykjavik," but, on the contrary, is putting up ever new obstacles on the road to mutually acceptable accords.

It is not accidental that making an address in Los Angeles the same day, Secretary Shultz said one phrase that should be taken note of.

"The Reagan administration is profoundly convinced that as important as are the reduction and eventual elimination of offensive nuclear weapons, arms control cannot be the main preoccupation of American foreign policy," he said.

In Reykjavik the Soviet Union advanced its proposals in a package which balances the security interests of both the Soviet and the American side. The Soviet Union's concessions are also part of the package. If there is no package there will be no concessions. Therefore, all attempts at dividing that package into parts and taking individual elements out of it, while doing nothing to restore the balance of compromises, are unacceptable.

The current word-juggling by officials of the Reagan administration who are trying to present the Soviet initiatives and the results of the Reykjavik meeting in a distorted light are an ungainly attempt at covering up shameful plans for unwinding the arms race with the help of demagoguery.

## Reagan 'Rejects Mutual Security'

PM031349 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Nov 86 Morning Edition pp 4-5

[Stanislav Kondrashov commentary: "Clarifying Reykjavik"]

[Text] It is difficult to discuss Reykjavik because so much has already been said on the subject. But it must be discussed because there is no event more important -- and it continues to develop, become clearer, and have effect.

For 2 days two men talked together in an atmosphere of the strictest secrecy on the shore of a cold and remote bay. And immediately after their meeting -- the most detailed reports, no secrets, nothing behind the scenes. This is the world of today, with its electronic speed and complex sensation of unity born of the desire to overcome contradictions that are lethally dangerous to everyone. This is the nature of present summit meetings: They at least give those taking part the opportunity to define their positions before the whole of an avidly attentive mankind.

The leaders of the two great powers have no cause to complain of insufficient attention. But when they meet, attention is not merely doubled -- it increases tenfold. To an even greater extent than Geneva, Reykjavik was a mouthpiece, an amplifier, a megaphone. And it is with this, in my opinion, that its significance begins for the world public, which wants to know the policies of Moscow and Washington and draw its own conclusions.

Reykjavik gave the Soviet leader the opportunity to expound our position on the most important arms control issues before an unprecedentedly wide audience and at a dramatic moment of the summit.

It is well known that the Soviet program, the Soviet stage-by-stage route to a nuclear-free world, was made public in M.S. Gorbachev's statement on 15 January this year.

To a large extent the Reykjavik package is based on that statement. But in some areas, medium-range nuclear weapons in particular, the Soviet Union went further to meet the position of the United States and the European nuclear powers -- Britain and France -- and made major concessions.

The response to the Soviet package set out at the negotiating table before the American President and then -- immediately after -- before the whole world has been unprecedently broad. Thanks to Reykjavik's unique amplifying effect, our willingness for nuclear disarmament has become even more convincing and has been conveyed to a very large number of people in America, Europe, Asia, everywhere. This would appear to be a benefit from the meeting in Iceland -- a benefit already fully apparent. Although only the future can fully determine the political potential and political result of Reykjavik, the world now has a clearer idea of the Soviet position, the American position, and the historic opportunity to reach agreement which has now been missed -- owing to the U.S. President's devotion to his "Strategic Defense Initiative."

There is more. With the speed characteristic of the nuclear missile-electronic age, the package of Soviet proposals was transmitted from Iceland to the political tables of all interested capitals. The struggle surrounding the legacy left by the summit meeting and interpretation of that legacy began immediately. To all appearances, this struggle will be prolonged and intense. It must not be forgotten that it is not the public, whose eyes have been opened to the Soviet proposals, but official circles that have the final say in the political practice of any Western state, at the moment at least. And these official circles, like the unofficial political circles which share their opinions, have long mastered the art of closing even the most wide-open eyes -- through various clarifications and explanations distorting what really happened.

Standing up close, the whole face can't be seen.... M.S. Gorbachev quoted this apt line from Yesenin at a press conference in Reykjavik, explaining to journalists that immediately after the meeting he could only communicate his first impressions and first analysis. And then, imagine, the American President now claims that the Soviet leader failed to grasp his position although in fact it is he -- the American President -- who is deviating from his own Reykjavik position.

What is really happening? Face to face with the Soviet leader, the U.S. President declared his willingness to eliminate all strategic nuclear arms in the course of the next 10 years. Now, back in Washington again, his advisers say that the President was misunderstood and that he only envisaged the complete elimination of ballistic missiles. This is less advantageous to the Soviet Union than America, which would thereby retain its superiority in strategic bombers and cruise missiles.

As is well known, authoritative representatives of the USSR Foreign Ministry have refuted the President's advisers by citing actual quotes from the President -- from the transcript of the talks in Reykjavik between the two leaders. Unfortunately, words are easier to refute than facts -- facts which show that, given the present correlation of forces in U.S. ruling circles, today's American Administration is highly skeptical of the prospect of a nonnuclear future. Either on earth, where it intends to retain (and increase) nuclear weapons, or in space, where it would like to deploy these weapons in one way or another. The post-Reykjavik debates across the ocean make this clear.

And the reaction in Western Europe has revealed something else. Bonn, London, and Paris have ceased to support Ronald Reagan's "zero option," which envisaged the elimination of all Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe. This has not happened out of opposition to Washington but since the Soviet Union agreed to this option in Reykjavik -- laying aside, incidentally, its own quite valid objections to the British and French missiles. Since the Soviet concession in Reykjavik the U.S. West European allies have hastily restructured their arguments in order to...reject this concession. Now they are insisting that nuclear disarmament in the European theater would be dangerous for them because it would supposedly weaken the American nuclear shield and increase Soviet superiority in conventional weapons. It turns out that they prefer a Europe filled with nuclear weapons and are even prepared to reconcile themselves to the Soviet missiles as long as the American ones remain, as long as Europe does not become nonnuclear.

This kind of political and propaganda about-face in West European capitals forces one to stop and think how serious they are in looking for ways to reduce tension. Well, here, too, the picture is becoming clearer and more real.

Let us return to the American President, however. On his return from Reykjavik he immediately went on a lightning tour of his country's cities and rural areas, immersing himself in the fever of the last days before the congressional elections and agitating for the Republican candidates for the Senate and the House of Representatives. In this respect he did the real American thing and sold Reykjavik, persuading people that it is only thanks to the positions of strength he has created that American-Soviet dialogue is maintained and that his loyalty to SDI is the main incentive -- for Moscow -- to continue this dialogue.

This is the leitmotiv which runs through his speeches: "No responsible President can count on the Russians' promises when it comes to guaranteeing the security of his country.... We can either count on American technology or on the promises made by the Soviet Union -- both have their own reputation -- and I am ready to count on American technology every time."

These revelations to ordinary domestic audiences not only display the usual oath of loyalty to SDI -- the President's favorite offspring -- and not only the typically American preference for technological solutions over political ones. They also show a rejection of the concept of mutual security -- a rejection which is dangerous to the cause of peace. Because no "Soviet promises" to America can exist outside jointly elaborated American-Soviet accords which coordinate the balance of interests. The long-standing imperial complex of American exclusivity and the old arrogant way of thinking, which dictates the need to safeguard America's security in isolation and, what is more, to the detriment of others, made themselves felt in Reykjavik. And they continue to do so. Which proves what difficult tasks we have still to resolve -- persistently and consistently -- in our relations with the United States.

## Reagan 'Alarmed' After Meeting

LD030031 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 2 Nov 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast: video talk by publicist Vitaliy Kobysh]

[Text] The fact that the Soviet-U.S. accord in the Icelandic capital -- an accord which could have led to the arms race being halted and peoples being saved from the nuclear threat -- became a direct victim of the SDI, that is the Star Wars program, the fact that mankind's interests were sacrificed to this program, is known to all.

What is less well known is how President Reagan, who represents the U.S. military-industrial complex, made so bold as to come close to such an accord. How is one to explain the subsequent strange, contradictory and at times absurd actions of the U.S. Administration?

Gradually, much is becoming clear. Those of us who were in Reykjavik remember the dejected expressions on the faces of Reagan and State Secretary Shultz when they emerged from Hofdi House, the venue of the meeting. Truth to tell, it was not easy at that moment to understand what, in actual fact, was taking place. Could it really have been that Reagan and his people were so distressed, distressed by the fact that it was found possible to reach a final accord on curbing the nuclear arms race, to push the nuclear genie back into the bottle?

The President, journalists close to the White House explain, was extremely alarmed at what happened in Reykjavik, for two reasons.

First, he was alarmed by the fact that having failed to ask the military-industrial complex for permission, he came close to reaching an accord [poshel na dogovorennost] on problems, any serious examination of which has simply never before been allowed to take place. Second, he was alarmed by the fact that his favorite brainchild, SDI, exposed as it was to everyone's scrutiny, appeared to be the main obstacle to halting stockpiling of instruments of war.

Witnesses on board the presidential plane which left Iceland for the United States report that Reagan and member of his team were clutching their heads: What ever have we done, how are we to face world public opinion, and how is one now to go about advertising the Star Wars program?

It was also there, on the plane, that the decision was made to change radically the propaganda tactics.

Poindexter, national security adviser to the President, was detailed to the section of the plane where White House-accredited U.S. correspondents were sitting. It is difficult to convey how dumbfounded they were when they heard from Poindexter that the President was in an excellent mood; that in his view an accord had been reached at the meeting on the fundamental problems of historic significance, and that it was he, Reagan, who posed these problems. It is only a pity that the Soviet side picked on certain formulas pertaining to the SDI, this exclusively defensive program that does not threaten anyone with anything, and that it had wrecked that accord.

As you can see, you cannot keep anything secret in this world when what is at stake are things that determine mankind's security, its future. SDI is already killing not merely international accords but also commonsense, the sense of responsibility and common decency.

## 'Disdainful' Reagan Remarks

PM031247 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Nov 86 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Justifying an Unconstructive Position"]

[Text] Washington, 3 Nov -- The Reagan administration, trying to justify itself to Americans for the unconstructive stance that it adopted during the Reykjavik summit, is not letting up in its forceful propaganda campaign.

Speeches by official representatives continue to crudely distort the meeting's course and results. No light has been shed on the matter by recent speeches by President Reagan who, during his traditional Saturday radio broadcast in particular, again talked about the administration's "readiness" to work for progress in limiting strategic nuclear armaments. The value of such assurances, however, is graphically demonstrated by Reagan's own extremely disdainful statements on possible agreements in this sphere. "No responsible President should rely solely on a piece of paper when it comes to safeguarding our country's security," Reagan said. At the same time he again stressed that he has no intention of abandoning the "Star Wars" program and went all out to boost the "firm approach" to the Soviet Union.

Analyzing such short-term post-Reykjavik maneuvers by administration representatives, the WASHINGTON POST stresses today that Reagan has embarked on the "strangest propaganda campaign of his entire presidency."

## U.S. Insistence on SDI

LD032220 Moscow Television in Russian 1800 GMT 3 Nov 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast; interview with Academician Yevgeniy Primakov, by unidentified interviewer; time and place not given -- recorded]

[Text] [Unidentified interviewer] Mid-term elections are to be held in the United States tomorrow. President Reagan took an active part in the election campaign and has made the question of the so-called SDI into one of the main questions of foreign policy. Well, what arguments did he use in this?

[Primakov] Well, two usual arguments that he had already used prior to the election campaign and during its course. First the SDI, it is alleged, is capable of reliable defense of the United States and its allies. Second, it is alleged that in Reykjavik his role was that of a peacemaker; he was also firm and he would even have none of the deep cuts proposed by the USSR in the package involving action against the SDI. Here, then are his two arguments.

However, they absolutely fail to correspond to reality. Let us begin by saying that scientists and experts from numerous countries are of the view that a reliable defense against nuclear arms, against nuclear missiles, cannot be created in the shape of the SDI. A defense of this kind cannot be created. It is technically not feasible. Many, including -- well, I have recently been in Japan, attending a symposium organized by the paper MAINICHU and McNamara, the former U.S. defense secretary took part in this symposium -- well, he called this idea an unrealizable and strange dream.

[Interviewer] Then why is it that we are so active against this idea?

[Primakov] Well, this is a good question. We are so active against this idea because, in practice, it blocks nuclear disarmament, because it blocks arms reductions. I would like to ask our esteemed television viewers to return to Reykjavik. There, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev put the question in the following way: Please, nurse your SDI, go ahead with research and tests even -- but do not put them into space, do not take it out into spac[illegible]

After all, it should be understood that the very fact of it being put into space brings up where to begin with, you will draw the line between tests in space and the deployment of nuclear arms in space. What wall can there be between these two positions, between these two processes? This means that we are exposed, since the Americans can put the arms out and site them on platforms; moreover, these are offensive weapons. Furthermore, this was linked by us -- I am talking of the possibility of such research outside of space and of tests outside of space within the

SDI framework -- we linked these directly with the fact that the United States and we would, for a period of 10 years, not go beyond the ABM Treaty, the Antiballistic Missile Treaty which, as is known, was signed in 1972 and which is the basis for any arms reductions we have implemented.

Does it follow from this that we fear the SDI? Of course not. However, we can see only too well where the United States is taking these matters under the guise of the SDI. And they are going about it in such as way as to, first, create new types and new systems of nuclear arms on which they are working, because work on the SDI is not just work on some unrealizable and strange dream. It is, you understand, work that makes it possible to attain breakthroughs in various areas, moreover breakthroughs in the form of tangible results of one kind or another to do with qualitative improvements of various types of arms. Second -- and this worries us a lot and it is natural that we should be worried -- under the guise of the SDI work, the United States is altogether doing away with the ABM Treaty which is very important, I would say extraordinarily important, since it prevents the possibility of, on the one hand, the arms race, an unrestrained arms race and, on the other hand, it creates conditions for arms reductions. That is why we are against the SDI.

President Reagan has turned the SDI into a sacred cow which, he says, must not be touched. But I wish to say that we harbor no intentions of butchering this sacred cow, we are confident it will die of its own accord.

Then who needs this sacred cow? It is needed by business, it is needed by business. Moreover, it is needed by business that is not only and not so much interested in creating some kind of SDI which will be the ideal defensive weapon; but business that is interested in the arms race both within the framework of the SDI and, so to speak, without this framework, business that is against arms reductions, since these take away its profits.

I have in mind here the military and industrial sector of U.S. business. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev stressed that it plays a big part, although one should not overestimate the importance of this sector in all business.

That is why real opportunities are being created for the U.S. business and for the U.S. politicians generally to rethink their positions, if they approach what is taking place in the world with a genuine sense of responsibility.

[Interviewer] Thank you very much.

[Primakov] Not at all.

## U.S. Distortion Continues

LD040910 Moscow TASS in English 0831 GMT 4 Nov 86

[Text] Moscow November 4 TASS -- By TASS analyst Vasiliy Kharkov:

U.S. President Ronald Reagan, in defending his destructive stand that thwarted a possible agreement in Reykjavik, continues to distort the outcome of the Soviet-American meeting.

TIME magazine has published the White House chief's explanation of what happened in Reykjavik. In accusing the Soviet side of inflexibility, Reagan said that if the USSR had agreed to the United States' having the "SDI shield", it would have been an easy job to sign the agreement on destroying all ballistic missiles.

The current Washington Administration is stubbornly clutching at SDI in the hope of gaining military superiority. This is precisely why Washington rejected the package of Soviet proposals leading to nuclear disarmament.

It is through the fault of the American side that the chance for adopting historic decisions towards a nuclear-free world was passed up in Reykjavik.

Many prominent political and public figures in the U.S. understand the situation and criticise the Administration for sacrificing the immense opportunities to the "Star Wars."

And in view of all that offical Washington is accusing the Soviet side of being inflexible. Mikhail Gorbachev gave a clear appraisal of the Soviet stance in Reykjavik, explained why the American side preferred SDI to nuclear disarmament.

The chief danger of SDI, as the Soviet Union sees it, is the transfer of the arms race into a new sphere, the aspiration to place offensive weapons in space and thus gain military superiority.

Playing on the illusory hopes of some Americans, the SDI advocates are seeking to present it as a defensive anti-nuclear shield. In fact, SDI is an integral part of the first-strike doctrine.

/6091
CSO: 5200/1081

## UK DEFENSE SECRETARY CITES NEED TO RETAIN NUCLEAR ARMS

London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1435 GMT 21 Oct 86

[Article by David Wallen, PA defense correspondent]

[Text]

[Text] Defence Secretary George Younger warned his NATO allies today that Europe could not be defended without nuclear weapons. He gave full backing to President Reagan's stance at the Iceland summit and said the West should not create the impression that the defence of Europe could be assured without nuclear weapons.

NATO's defence ministers began discussing the outcome of the summit at a meeting in Gleneagles, Perthshire, today. Military chiefs, including Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Bernard Rogers, are concerned that the removal of cruiseand Pershing II missiles as part of a future East-West deal would leave the Soviet Union with an overwhelming 9:1 superiority in shorter range weapons. Mr Younger believes there should be negotiations to reach parity on these missiles too.

Speaking after the first three-hour session of the two-day meeting, Mr Younger admitted there was a clear link between reductions in long range intermediate nuclear force weapons like cruise and Pershing II and the short-range, and he said any deal should take this into account. He thought Soviet concern over the weakness of their economy might make them negotiate on shorter-range weapons even after a deal on the longer range. "They want to get a reduction in the tremendous strain on their economy of keeping these systems going," said Mr Younger.

He said eventually Britain's independent nuclear deterrent, Polaris and its successor Trident, could be taken into account when major reductions in larger strategic nuclear weapons were discussed.

Several European members of the alliance are concerned about the Soviet strength in short-range missiles, like the SS21, SS22, and SS23. West German Deputy Defence Minister Dr Lothar Ruhl called on the alliance to look at the problem as a "very urgent" matter.

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CSO: 5240/013

## PORTUGAL'S PCP LEADER ON REYKJAVIK SUMMIT

LD281904 Lisbon International Service in Portuguese 1300 GMT 28 Oct 86

[Excerpts] The PCP secretary general arrived late this morning at Lisbon airport after visiting six [as heard] European countries last week.

This visit, which for obvious political reasons could not be altered, was overshadowed by the death of Samora Machel, said PCP Secretary Genral Alvaro Cunhal this morning to journalists at Lisbon airport on his return from a trip that took him to Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia at the invitation of the Central Committees of the communist parties of those countries.

[Unidentified reporter] Thus, convergence between the PCP and other parties with regard to the last summit...

[Cunhal, interrupting] In connection with the Gorbachev-Reagan summit, I can say that there is a positive appraisal of the event. It was a positive event which immediately opens up possibilities for the struggle for peace and which, incidentally, before the entire world established a very obvious contrast between constructive proposals and proposals whose value is (?matchless). Even the very acceptance by Reagan of these proposals during the first phase of the talks — proposals that were constructive, proposals of peace by the USSR — and the continuation and insistence by the U.S. leaders on SDI, therefore, on the arms race, although in a (?bottled) form, (?thus denying) accords which could solve immediate problems [words indistinct]. [end recording]

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CSO: 5200/2441

## BRIEFS

**NIGERIA URGES CONTINUED DIALOG**--Nigeria has urged President Ronald Reagan of the United States and the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, to continue to hold dialogue on important matters including arms control despite their stalemate at talks in Iceland. In separate messages of the two leaders, President Abrahim Babangida remarked that the fact that the superpowers held the meeting was a positive and constructive initiative. He expressed the hope that the summit had contributed to a reduction of tension in the world over the fear of a nuclear war. President Babangida called on other leaders who are in conflict situations to emulate the Soviet and American leaders. [Text] [Lagos Domestic Service in English 1800 GMT 13 Oct 86 AB] /9274

CSO: 5200/1

## SALT/START ISSUES

### TASS: SAC CHIEF CITES PLAN TO DEPLOY ICBM'S ON TRAINS

LD271909 Moscow TASS in English 1812 GMT 27 Oct 86

[Text] New York October 27 TASS -- The commander of the Strategic Air Command of the United States, General John T. Chain, Jr., has stated the need to build another 50 MX Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and deploy them on trains that would travel the nation in times of tension.

In an interview published by THE NEW YORK TIMES newspaper he pointed out that the missiles could not be detected from space or the ground while in motion, could be fired with accuracy and could be deployed largely on existing trains and tracks.

Congress is known to have already endorsed the construction of MX missiles. If the general's plan is accepted, their number will grow to total 100.

THE NEW YORK TIMES points out in this connection that two of the new missiles have been deployed at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming, with another eight to be deployed there before the end of the year.

The newspaper draws attention to the fact that MX missiles are only part of a programme being implemented by the Reagan administration to modernise U.S. strategic forces.

The modernisation programme envisages, in particular, the creation of a fleet of B-1 strategic bombers which have already begun coming into force, and Trident-2 submarine-launched D-5 International Ballistic Missiles.

/6091
CSO: 5200/1071

## TASS: U.S. PLANS CARRIER-BASED STEALTH AIRCRAFT

PM041425 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Oct 86 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Development of 'Invisible' Ground-Attack Aircraft"]

[Text] Washington, 30 Oct -- The Pentagon has taken another step down the road of creating [sozdaniye] qualitatively new types of first strike weapons. According to the U.S. press, the Department of the Navy has instructed a number of major military-industrial corporations to begin with the development [razrabotka] of a ground-attack aircraft using "Stealth" technology. Such aircraft, described as "invisible," will, the Pentagon is hoping, be virtually undetectable on radar screens since their airframe absorbs rather thanm reflects radar waves.

The contract has been concluded with two groups of companies including the giants of the military-industrial complex -- Northrop, Grumman, and Mcdonnel-Douglas -- with a view to choosing the better of the two designs once they are submitted. All the details of the deal are top secret. However, specialists believe that the new aircraft could enter the arsenal as early as the middle of the decade. This warplane is intended primarily to replace the present A-6 and A-7 ground-attack aircraft, which are based mainly on aircraft carriers.

A spokesman for the U.S. Defense Department has categorically refused to comment on reports about this new program. However, local observers stress that this is a characteristic stance for the Pentagon to take in the case of so-called "black programs" concealed in the secret part of the defense budget. As is known, the U.S. Defense Department also failed to respond to the numerous alarmed questions of the U.S. press and the public in connection with the crash in August this year of a top secret fighter aircraft which, specialists believe, was likewise based in "Stealth" technology. Development work on an 'invisible' strategic bomber has also been going on in the United States for a long time.

The development [razrabotka] and the subsequent production [sozdaniye] of a qualitatively new ground-attack aircraft pursues above all the aim of considerably enhancing the strike power of aircraft carrier groups.

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CSO: 5200/1071

## SALT/START ISSUES

### BRIEFS

**TASS ON NEW USAF ICBM'S**--Washington October 29 TASS--The Pentagon intends to press for appropriations to build up its arsenals of strategic nuclear weapons, THE WASHINGTON POST reports. Quoting senior officials of the war department, the newspaper notes that the Air Force ministry is going to get another 50 MX missiles and to develop a new heavy mobile intercontinental ballistic missile with two warheads. It is also planning to start work on a programme to modernise its bomber fleet and to produce advanced cruise missiles. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 2203 GMT 29 Oct 86 LD] /6091

CSO: 5200/1071

# INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

## POSSIBLE DELAY IN FRENCH SX MISSILE PROJECT

PM041514 Paris LE MONDE in French 31 Oct 86 p 9

[Unattributed report: "Introduction of Mobile Missile Program Could Be Deferred"]

[Text] The actual introduction of the land-based mobile missile program, formerly dubbed the SX, could be postponed until 1988 within the context of the drafting of the next military planning law for the period 1987-91 examined at the Elysee Palace on Wednesday, 29 October, by a Defense Council session presided over by the head of state. This could be one of the main decisions reached by the Defense Council, according to as yet unconfirmed rumors from military circles.

No official information has been forthcoming about the substance of the 2 hours of talks between the president, prime minister, other ministers involved, and top military leaders.

Following the meeting the Elysee Palace spokesman merely indicated that a number of decisions had been reached and that Francois Mitterrand would be completing them after a few days' deliberation. The president added that he would make his final decisions known before a further Defense Council session to examine the military planning bill, whose text would then be submitted to parliament.

The Elysee spokesman said, however, that "the deterrence strategy depends essentially on the submarine component" (the missile-launching nuclear submarines of the strategic ocean-going force) and that "there can be no second component (the mobile land-based missile — *Le Monde* editor's note) introduced to the detriment of the first. The effectiveness of the first component must be guaranteed in particular by the timetable for the construction of the new generation submarines and their equipment with M-5 missiles" (a long-range sea-to-air missile carrying a dozen warheads) "by a set date."

This statement indirectly confirms rumors in military circles of a proposal to postpone until 1988, that is, after the next presidential election, the actual introduction of the mobile missile program (the plans for an S-4 missile mounted on unmarked trucks), otherwise known as the "wheeled missile." Between now and then studies will be continued into ways of deploying a weapon system of this kind, thanks to a relatively modest allocation (approximately Fr58 million in the 1987 draft defense budget, in the form of appropriations for payments). The program, whose cost is estimated at over Fr20 billion (excluding nuclear warheads), envisages the provision of some 30 so-called "random deployment" S-4 missiles armed with a single warhead to replace the Mirage-IV bombers and fixed surface-to-surface missiles housed in silos on the plateau d'Albion.

Mr Mitterrand does not want the development and deployment of the S-4's to be to the financial or chronological detriment of the M-5 submarine missiles.

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CSO: 5200/2444

## CSCE FOLLOW-UP CONFERENCE OPENS IN VIENNA 4 NOV

### Austria's Vranitzky Opening Speech

AU041330 Vienna Television Service in German 1001 GMT 4 Nov 86

[Speech given by Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky at the opening of the Vienna CSCE follow-up conference on 4 November in Vienna's Hofburg Palace — live]

[Text] Mr Chairman, your excellencies, ladies and gentlemen: It is an honor and a pleasure for me to cordially welcome you here today in Vienna at the beginning of the third CSCE follow-up conference. The personal attendance of so many high-level political representatives at the opening of the Vienna meeting is an expression of the continuous and serious interest in the ambitious program set down by the Helsinki Final Act for our common future.

In the middle of its second decade, the all-European process introduced in Helsinki has not lost any of its attractiveness despite various challenges. The reason for that is the unbroken convincing power of its basic concept, that is, that peace and security can only be realized by means of a long-term network of cooperation, a network comprising all areas in which states live together, that the practical effects of this cooperation must bring a tangible benefit to each individual citizen of our countries, and that instead of confrontation and the search for unilateral advantages there must be cooperation and the steadfast search for joint solutions if peace is to become visible and tangible for the individual.

The Helsinki Final Act provides us with a basis for this, and even today it impresses the objective reader with its far-sightedness and boldness.

In the past Austria itself and the surrounding region were always deeply affected by the repeated conflicts that divided the Europeans,by conflicts which did not just originate in unchecked striving for supremacy but were very often caused by internal discord and internal tensions within society. Experience has certainly impressed on all European states the desire to avoid past sufferings and mistakes in the future. This applies in particular to the states of this region and, of course, also to Austria.

We have tried to provide for our community the firm anchor of democracy and social balance and we have also tried to make use of our position here, in this critical part of Europe, to build confidence and to promote cooperation. Permanent neutrality is a good, even indispensible precondition for that. We do not consider it a carte blanche to slip away from the world and evade responsibility for shaping it, but as a call to make an appropriate contribution to an international order providing people and states with the preconditions for peaceful development.

The Vienna International Center, the home we built for the United Nations here in Vienna, and the participation of Austrian soldiers in peace-keeping operations are symbols of the worldwide dimension of this effort. The policy of good-neighborliness, with its positive effects that can be seen by everyone, represents the regional dimension of this effort.

We continue to participate with all our might and within the framework set by our permanent neutrality in the project of this century, the project of West European unity. A particularly important task for us is, however, to strengthen peace all over Europe and to create conditions for the whole of Europe that at least alleviate the detrimental consequences of the division of the continent. And in this connection, the Helsinki process is of essential importance.

All of us certainly know that we have come a long way from Helsinki to Vienna, a way that has to be judged more by the political developments in East-West relations than by the years that have passed. The path is characterized by high expectations, often by serious disappointments, by disillusionment, and by temporary exhaustion. Like a child of demanding parents, the CSCE process too — when considered in a level-headed way — has not fulfilled many expectations. The CSCE process has not stopped the arms race; it has not been able to eliminate our citizens' feeling of being threatened and powerless in the face of the overflowing arms arsenals; it has not achieved the situation in which the individual can enforce his basic freedoms and human rights in his respective state in the way provided for by the Helsinki Final Act.

And nevertheless, the basic guideline of state conduct set down in Helsinki and its conscientious observance by all participating states are still urgently topical, in particular in view of this situation. The insight that security is not only to be defined and determined in the military sense; that without observing human rights and without granting individuals the opportunity of unhindered contact with each other also across the borders of different economic, social, and political systems lasting peace is no longer imaginable; that everyone of us is responsible to the others for his conduct — these basic guidelines agreed on in Helsinki continue to be as relevant as before.

Most recent events have dramatically shown us something we are too often willing to forget in daily life: We live in one common world, in an inseparable world whose concrete problems do not at all follow differences of system or ideology. The threat to our safety and the world we live in is manifold and increasing. Only by consistent joint efforts can it be reduced again.

It is the historic merit of the CSCE to propose ways — despite all differences in our ideologies and the resulting practical consequences — to find solutions through joint political will that are acceptable to us all in view of the threats to our natural, human, and economic environment. This applies in particular also to the urgent task of arms control and disarmament. That very often this political will has been insufficient, that national selfishness and stubborn adherence to conduct in violation of agreements have again and again blocked the view toward a joint future is a fact that we have to account for to each other and to our public. This accountability report, this critical stocktaking will be one of the central tasks of the Vienna meeting and of any other CSCE follow-up conference.

The Helsinki Final Act has been a dynamic concept from the very start. The fact that during the second half of the century there has been relative stability in Europe, that the insecurity about dividing the room on our continent has come to an end, and that everyone of us has established his home under the given conditions must not lull us in false self-satisfaction and deceptive safety.

Now it is important to secure coexistence in Europe not only at the top level, that is, at the level of states, but to integrate this coexistence more deeply into our societies, to organize it with respect to the individual citizen within the framework of the conditions set down in Helsinki. it is important — and this is the unfulfilled and dynamically vivid demand of the CSCE — to deal with each other in a better way and to create better conditions for the people in ouir countries. Only when our borders are no longer considered insurmountable walls by the citizens have we fulfilled the Helsinki Final Act. Every European border which people cannot succeedin crossing psychologically and physically is, in the end, judged by our agreed standards, an unbearable historical anachronism.

Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, permit me to refer briefly here to two issues, which in view of the results of the preparatory meeting and of the future of the CSCE seem to be very important to me from the Austrian point of view. First, concerning the so-called openness. The agreement now achieved about better and, more important, more or less regular public access to the work of the CSCE seems to me to be a milestone. It is the expression of our joint will to face more, questioning, interested, and also critical people in the future. This has made at least a beginning to establishing — let me put it this way — ground contact between our negotiations and the citizens. Although this beginning is rather modest, it, nevertheless, has opened a door and has shown the direction in which we are to proceed. Without the continuous, serious attention and interest of the public the CSCE risks sliping into limbo, into a situation in which steady negotiating passes by the true interests of our citizens. The Helsinki Final Act regulates — and this is the basically new aspect — not only states' dealings with each other but also essential issues of states' dealings with their citizens. This also includes the citizens' right to inform themselves about our negotiations as continuously and directly as possible.

The second issue of the decisions of the preparatory meeting, which is remarkable from the Austrian point of view, is less spectacular perhaps, but it is of utmost importance for the future: The continuity of the CSCE process itself was agreed. What was partially achieved in Belgrade and Madrid — only by overcoming stubborn objections — is a fait accompli for the Vienna meeting. Regardless of other concrete results the Vienna meeting can only finally be concluded after date and venue of the next follow-up meeting have been set. That means that, in future, the continuity of the CSCE process can no longer be made hostage to other political demands.

I think this issue is of particular importance in view of the difficult problems which you, ladies and gentlemen of the delegations, will have to discuss over the next weeks and months.

Since 1975 the CSCE process has acquired new dimensions. This applies to the component of security policy with its aim of disarmament in the same way as to the problems of environmental protection and economic cooperation. In addition, there is the no less important problem of the credibility of the entire process in view of the serious lack of implementation in the humanitarian and human rights areas. In all these areas you, ladies and gentlemen, are required to provide imagination and steadfastness. The CSCE must become more practical, concrete, and most be conscious of the need to achieve results. The present demands practical and tangible solutions. We all know enough about the differences in our social and economic systems. They are not to be blurred or repressed in any way, they must be articulated.

Here I refer to the basic statements of Chancellor Kreisky on the occasion of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act: If these differences did not exist, the entire CSCE would not be necessary. The Helsinki Final Act, however, is not an instrument for undermining the position of the other party, but rather an instrument for making the dividing lines in Europe more bearable to the people affected by them. It is an instrument tailored to the European people for making our societies more humane, an instrument for activating our common European potential. And it is an instrument of continuous dialogue.

Ladies and gentlemen, some words in conclusion on this topic. Much is said about dialogue these days, in particular about the dialogue between the superpowers. Dialogue is something that cannot be proclaimed ex cathedra, so to speak. Dialogue must be established at all levels in order to yield results. It must be undivided, that means it must not establish any taboos or exclude particular matters from discussion. Its true meaning is reached only when it is based on the real will for compromise and thus does not risk becoming a dialogue for the sake of dialogue. But even a dialogue conducted with good intentions brings results only if it takes into consideration the interests of all parties and does not give more rights to one party than to the other. In the end, any willingness for dialogue will have to be judged by its concrete results.

In this connection I would like to quote the great Austrian Bertha von Suttner, and I quote: It is impossible to smile while baring one's teeth and impossible to shake hands with clenched fists — unquote. For this you need more than the dialogue between the great powers, even more than the dialogue between states alone. The individual does not benefit if his government decides on a policy of dialogue as long as he is not in practice the beneficiary of this political decision. Only when the individual has enforced his individual basic right to dialogue in his state will he be able to conduct a dialogue on the outside, across the borders. Thus dialogue must be enforced within each society and across the borders of states and systems. Historical experience has taught us in Austria that this is a difficult, thorny path always threatened by setbacks. We should always remember that we need tenacity, perseverance, and a high degree of patience.

Let us therefore conduct the dialogue on a firm basis accepted by us all: within the framework of the clear agreement of the Helsinki Final Act, the document that is a sign of confidence and hope for a peaceful Europe.

In this spirit, ladies and gentlemen, I hope for you and all of us that the Vienna meeting will be capable of taking advantage of the present willingness for dialogue and of transforming it into concrete results.

### Romanian, Vatican Envoys Addresses

*AU051135 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 5 Nov 86 p 1*

[Excerpts] Vienna — On Tuesday the official part of the large Vienna CSCE conference began with a speech by Chancellor Vrantizky. [passage omitted]

In the afternoon the series of addresses by the 35 foreign ministers was opened by Romanian Foreign Minister Ioan Totu. He advocated a united Europe vis-a-vis [gegenueber] the superpowers. Totu's speech did not give much room to the third basket (human rights). The Romanian used defensive arguments and deplored the attempts to limit humanitarian problems to only a few aspects and to poison the political atmosphere.

In contrast to this speech, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir Geoffrey howe stated that the third basket best represents people's hopes for practical progress. Howe called the reality in Europe in this respect a "bleak human scenery" where families are separated, believers are persecuted, and those wanting to emigrate are prohibited from doing so. As long as these things occur it is impossible to establish full trust between states, said Howe.

Archbishop Achille Silvestrini, the representative of the Holy See, also emphasized that man must be the focus of the CSCE process.

### Howe Speaks for EEC

*AU041604 Paris AFP in English 1558 GMT 4 Nov 86*

[Text] Vienna, Nov 4 (AFP) — British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe, addressing Tuesday's opening session of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), praised Soviet dissident Dr. Andrey Sakharov as one who keeps "alive the flame of the human spirit."

He added: "...And we remember too those whose names are not well known but whose lot is one of daily harassment, labour camp, exile or prison."

Sir Geoffrey, addressing the CSCE on behalf of the European Economic Community (EEC), had some harsh things to say about the lack of human rights in the communist bloc, but did not name any specific country. He stressed the interdependence, in the eyes of the West, of the CSCE'S three "baskets" — security, economic cooperation and the rights of man.

"Truth is not always welcome," he said, "but it can never be the enemy of better understanding."

He paid tribute to the recent joint declaration made by dissidents in four East European countries (Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland) which he said revealed "a bleak human landscape, a landscape in which families remain divided."

"Individuals who do not conform are brought ruthlessly to heel. Religious believers are harrassed."

Sir Geoffrey added: "Would-be emigrants of German, Jewish and other ethnic origins are denied the fundamental right to leave the country in which they find themselves."

He urged Eastern European countries to fully implement military measures voted last September in Stockholm, pointing out that "security cannot exist where distrust and suspicion reign."

On disarmament, he spoke of "prospects for real progress," describing the Reyjavik summit as a "significant and valuable exercise in exploration of ways forward towards balanced and verifiable agreements on arms reductions."

Sir Geoffrey added that this "progress was not only in the field of security, but also in respect for human rights and in regional issues."

He continued: "Confidence is indivisible and the CSCE must do something for ordinary people" and not only at government level.

He concluded to the 35-nation meeting: "We shall work to remove restrictions on travel, to reunify families, to achieve a genuine freedom of emigration... We are realists. These results will not be achieved overnight. But we are also hopeful. This meeting at Vienna represents an opportunity not just to talk but to get results."

### Raimond Discusses Nuclear Weapons

*AU041610 Paris AFP in English 1559 GMT 4 Nov 86*

[Text] Vienna, Nov 4 (AFP) — French Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond defended here Tuesday the conditional maintenance of U.S. nuclear weapons in Western Europe.

"Negotiations that concluded in the total disappearance of American nuclear weapons in Europe," he told the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), "without the imbalances in conventional and chemical weapons being equally reduced, would be dangerous for the security of the European continent."

A Europe where "the level of conventional arsenals remained as high would not be a safer Europe," he added.

He opposed the idea of "a drift toward the progressive militarisation of the CSCE process" and insisted on the need to respect the balance between the three baskets of the Helsinki Final Act, which is high on the CSCE agenda.

"Concerning the human dimension of the CSCE," he said, "it seems to us the moment has come to proceed to the 'qualitative jump' that the Stockholm conference enabled to be achieved in the field of measures of trust."

### Italy's Andreotti Address to Conference

*AU050951 Rome ANSA in English 0900 GMT 5 Nov 86*

[Text] Vienna, November 4 — In his address to the 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), here on Tuesday, Italian Foreign Minister Guilio Andreotti described the group as the "axis" of East-West dialogue.

Andreotti went on to point out that the Final Act of the Helsinki agreements, even if many important aspects of the agreements have yet to be applied, such as the issue of human rights, has always represented a fundamental point of reference and has guaranteed the reciprocal stability of relations between European nations despite the political ideologies they follow. It was an occasion to "recuperate the unity and human and cultural identity of Europe" Andreotti said.

The Italian foreign minister arrived here on Monday directly from Shanghai, at the conclusion of the official Chinese visit by Italian Premier Bettino Craxi. Andreotti immediately began to meet which his European colleagues in particular the foreign ministers of Switzerland, Sweden and Hungary.

During his stay here, Andreotti will also have meetings with other foreign affairs representatives including U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

Bilateral, multi-lateral and relations between the European Community and NATO members will be at the center of many of Andreotti's talks.

During his address, Andreotti recalled Italy's hopes for the CSCE and said that he was "comforted" by the outcome of the

Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe which, according to the Italian foreign minister, showed that on all sides existed the willingness for compromise and this gave rise for hope even in the delicate field of military security.

The CSCE got underway here on Tuesday in a climate which appeared very promising. No one, including the Soviets, seemed to give too much importance to the failure of the recent "informal" Iceland summit between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Kremlin leader Mikhail Gorbachev. "We are neither disappointed nor worried for what occurred in Iceland" Andreotti said, underlining the importance of what was agreed upon by the superpower leaders on the theme of arms reduction.

What Italy hopes will be achieved during the CSCE, according to Andreotti, is a breakthrough in the 13-year Mutual Balance Force Reduction negotiations which have yet to achieve any result on the issue of reducing conventional weapons in Europe.

Andreotti then illustrated the proposal to set up a commission, composed of representatives from all the 35 nation-members of the CSCE, which would be given the mandate to carry out and verify the eventually agreed upon reductions of military arsenals.

The Italian foreign minister went on to underlined that without respect for human rights, as guaranteed by the 1975 Helsinki agreements, the negotiations on conventional arms would have not hope of success.

On this point, Andreotti called direct attention to the obstacles which he said were still prohibiting the re-unification of families, personal contacts and freedom of movement. Nevertheless, Andreotti ruled out that the Vienna conference should be turned into a trial to judge the Soviet Union's failure to guarantee these human rights.

Other arguments dealth with by Andreotti included his appeal for a "science without borders" and the birth of a "Europe for culture."

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CSO: 5200/2444

## BILATERAL MEETINGS ON SIDELINES OF CSCE CONFERENCE

### Vranitzky, Howe Talk

AU051143 Vienna WIENER ZEITUNG in German 5 Nov 86 p 1

[Excerpts][Passage omitted] On Tuesday, shortly after the opening of the Vienna CSCE follow-up conference, Chancellor Franz Vranitzky received British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir Geoffrey Howe for a talk. According to reports from the Chancellor's Office the two politicians held an exchange of opinion on bilateral and international questions. In particular they discussed the situation of disarmament problems after the latest summit meeting in Reykjavik and the chances for success of the CSCE conference.

Tuesday morning, before the official opening of the CSCE conference, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze received his British counterpart Sir Geoffrey Howe for an about 1-hour talk in the soviet Embassy in Vienna. [passage omitted]

On Tuesday, after the official opening of the CSCE follow-up conference, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and French Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond discussed in a 1-hour talk in Vienna's Hofburg Palace issues of the CSCE process and the Reykjavik summit. The French foreign minister assessed the talks as "very constructive."

Italian Foreign Minister Guilio Andreotti, who is staying in Vienna for the opening of the CSCE follow-up conference, paid a visit to Vienna's Archbishop Hans Hermann Goer on Tuesday morning.

Austrian Foreign Minister Peter Jankowitsch met for half-hour talk with his French counterpart Jean-Bernard Raimond on Tuesday in the Foreign Ministry.

### Further Report

*AU041331 Paris AFP in English 1253 GMT 4 Nov 86*

[Text] Vienna, Nov 4 (AFP) — The third "review" conference of the 35-nation Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe opened here Tuesday, but much attention was focussed on the wide series of East-West bilateral contacts due to take place throughout the week.

The conference, aimed at assessing progress achieved since the signature of the Helsinki accords in 1975, was opened at the former imperial Hofburg Palace by Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky.

The chancellor praised the long-running talks as now being "uncontested," but regretting that "certain expectations had not been fulfilled," notably a halt to the arms race.

Bilateral meetings between the various participating countries, however, held most of the limelight.

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, who is due to meet U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz in a resumption of the superpower dialogue Wednesday, held an hour of talks with British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe on Tuesday morning.

Sir Geoffrey told reporters he hoped the disarmament accords sketched out at the Reykjavik talks last month between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Communist Party chief Mikhail Gorbachev would produce concrete results.

But he expressed "concern" over the what he said was Mr. Gorbachev's insistence that any agreement on medium-range and strategic missiles should be linked to a ban on the deployment of the Strategic Defense Initiative — Mr. Reagan's space-based "Star Wars" missile shield.

The British foreign secretary further stressed the importance of reaching an agreement on limiting conventional and chemical weapons.

Mr. Shevardnadze's program also included a meeting on Tuesday morning with his French counterpart Jean-Bernard Raimond, who described the talks as "very constructive".

A Soviet roving Ambassador Oleg Grinevskiy, meanwhile, told a news conference coinciding with the opening of the conference that the Reykjavik meeting had opened "new horizons" for progress on disarmament.

Mr. Grinevskiy, chief negotiator at the recently completed CDE talks on "confidence building measures" in Stockholm, said steps forward "depended on the political will to transform the possibilities into agreements."

In response to questions, he declined to give details on the Soviet negotiating stance on conventional weapons, referring reporters to Mr. Shevardnadze's scheduled address on Wednesday to the conference.

He acknowledged, however, that there was a "certain imbalance" in conventional weapons between the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact.

Andrey Kokoshin, deputy director of the Soviet Institute for the United States, told reporters that this week's talks between Mr. Shevardnadze and Mr. Shultz would play a "major role" in moves towards disarmament. But meetings planned with other participants at the conference were "no less important," he said.

The conference, attended by 35 signatories of the Helsinki accord (all states in Europe except Albania, plus the United States and Canada), follows earlier lengthy review meetings in Belgrade and Madrid.

The opening session also included a message read on behalf of U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, who praised the CSCE as "one of the most important and promising political processes of our time" and stressed the responsibility of participants in "the progress of the entire world."

Speakers were due to launch the debates later in the day, starting with Romania's Ioan Totu.

The meeting was also serving as a backdrop for appeals by groups representing East European dissidents and human rights activists.

Delegates filing into the Hofburg Palace Tuesday morning were met by a Jew symbolically placed in a cage and guarded by a bear in protest at the refusal of Soviet authorities to allow mass Jewish emigration.

Other demonstrators outside the hall called for the liberation of "Turkish-occupied" Kurdistan and freedom for German-speaking South Tyrol from the "Italian yoke."

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CSO: 5200/2444

## EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

### PRESS CONFERENCE OF USSR DELEGATION TO CSCE

AU041641 Vienna Domestic Service in German 1100 GMT 4 Nov 86

[Raimund Loew report on a press conference held by the USSR delegation to the CSCE in Vienna on 4 November — recorded]

[Text] A Soviet press briefing was held 1 and 1/2 hours before the official start of the conference. Present at the podium in addition to Vladimir Lomeyko, head of the Soviet delegation to the Vienna conference, are Andrey Kokoshin, expert on the United States and Oleg Grinevskiy, Soviet spokesman at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe that was concluded this summer. This composition of personages indicates the program, because the Soviet Union wants to continue the process of detente with Washington through Vienna and take a decisive step toward disarmament in Europe.

Oleg Grinevskiy gives a fundamentally optimistic picture of the East-West situation: The Reykjavik summit has opened new horizons and created new possibilities. The Stockholm conference, a product of the CSCE process, has demonstrated that a process including all of Europe would be the best framework for cooperation between East and West. The Soviet representative recalls that in Stockholm the Warsaw Pact states have agreed to military on-site inspections. We are clearly interested in also implementing such agreements, Grinevskiy said, and he outlined the Soviet goal for Vienna. The way is clear, he continued: From Stockholm part one we want to get to Stockholm part two, via Vienna. The Vienna conference is to give the Stockholm sideline conference a mandate for a second phase in which not only security and confidence-building will be discussed, as up to now, but also the reduction of weapons arsenals and military expenditures. The Soviets stress that they mean Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, that they also include the Soviet part, the European part of the Soviet Union and that they do not want to discuss only nuclear armament.

Grinevskiy says: We regard the desired elimination of nuclear intermediate-range missiles in Europe not as an isolated issue. Hand in hand with that, the Warsaw Pact states are also prepared to take serious measures regarding conventional disarmament. Our proposal is valid — a reduction of half a million soldiers on both sides. The Soviets do not want to rule out the joining of the MBFR talks, now going on for 13 years, with the Stockholm conference. And again and again it is stated: We want the Vienna follow-up conference to enrich the Stockholm conference by adding a mandate to negotiate on military disarmament too.

The delegation head of the Vienna conference, Vladmimir Lomeyko, criticizes the irresolute attitude of the United States to the Reykjavik negotiations. When Reagan and Gorbachev talked, the talks were taken down in shorthand. The Soviet Union, he indicates, has no objections to making this stengraphic record known to the world public.

Tomorrow, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will present the concrete measures proposed by the Soviet Union in his address here in the Vienna Hofburg.

The Soviet position for the Vienna meeting, however, seems to be clear: Everything can be discussed, but results are particularly wanted in the military sector. And in order to move from a purely Soviet-American dialogue to a disarmament process including all 35 CSCE states, there are indications of the possibility of significant compromises on technical issues.

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## FRG, USSR OFFICIALS ON NUCLEAR-FREE CORRIDOR, SUMMIT

### SED-SPD Press Conference

PM240823 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Oct 86 First Edition p 5

[Own correspondent Yu. Yakhontov dispatch "'Corridor' to a Nuclear-Free Europe; Joint SED-SPD Initiative"]

[Text] Bonn, 22 Oct -- At a press conference given in Bonn by H. Axen, member of the Politburo and secretary of the SED Central Committee, and E. Bahr, member of the Presidium of the SPD (FRG), an extremely important joint political initiative in the sphere of disarmament -- "The Principles for Creating a Nuclear-Free Corridor in Central Europe" -- was brought to the notice of the public. This initiative has been approved by the SED Central Committee at the suggestion of E. Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee, and also by the Presidium of the SPD at the suggestion of W. Brandt, chairman of the SPD, and H. -J. Vogel, chairman of the SPD Bundestag faction.

The "principles" were drawn up by a working group of both parties on the basis of the "Palme Commission" recommendations. The joint group has proposed that a 150-km-wide nuclear-free corridor be crated in central Europe, on the territory of the FRG, the GDR, and the CSSR, on either side of the line separating NATO and the Warsaw pact. As is known, the Soviet Union supported the "Palme Commission" recommendations.

The submitted "principles" envisage that 3 years after the establishment of the corridor, governments will enter into talks on expanding the corridor into a nuclear-free zone in central Europe.

The "Principles for the Creation of a Nuclear-Free Corridor in Central Europe," a joint communique says, "are an appeal to all governments in East and West which have armed forces deployed in the area of the proposed corridor to embark on talks about the creation of this corridor as soon as possible."

After the success in Stockholm, where an accord was reached on confidence-building measures from the Atlantic to the Urals, thanks to which the possibility of a sudden attack has become less likely than up to now, the creation of a nuclear-free corridor in accordance with the principles which have been drawn up would make it possible to further extend the time for political notification and to lower the level of the strike potential. Therefore, the communique notes, the creation of this corridor would be genuine confidence-building measure which would be fully in keeping with the spirit of Stockholm. In view of the fact that not only nuclear means but all types of weapons usable both in their nuclear and conventional versions would be withdrawn from the corridor to either side of the line separating the two military blocs, this measure would even go beyond the framework of the Stockholm accords.

Addressing the press conference, H. Axen, member of the Politburo and secretary of the SED Central Committee, drew attention to the fact that irrespective of the fact that the two parties, the SED and the SPD, occupy different political and ideological positions and operate in states with different social ystems, they are essentially in full agreement that there is no more important task than to ensure the survival of mankind.

E. Bahr, member of the SPD Presidium, noted that particularly after Reykjavik special significance attached to the "Principles" that have been submitted. Reykjavik once again convincingly confirmed that exceptional responsibility for world peace rests on the two superpowers and emphasized that small and medium-sized states in Europe also bear their share of the responsibility which cannot be shifted to anybody.

In June 1985 the SED and the SPD already took an important step in the sphere of disarmament when they drew up and submitted a draft agreement on the creation of a chemical weapon-free zone in Europe. This draft was also submitted to the FRG Government. However, it did not back it, claiming that as the SPD was an opposition rather than the ruling party it had no right to engage in foreign policy "on the side." This excuse caused just indignation among progressive peace-loving circles. The FRG public expresses the hope that on this occasion the country's government will not shrug off this major political initiative in the sphere of disarmament but will support it instead. This would accord with the assurances which the government has repeated more than once that war will never again be initiated from German territory.

## USSR Delegation Discussion

LD232243 Moscow TASS in English 2210 GMT 23 Oct 86

[Excerpts] Bonn, 23 October (TASS)--A delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet headed by Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Yuriy Batalin, now staying here at the invitation of the FRG Bundestag, was present at the Bundestag plenary meeting today. The Soviet delegation was greeted by Vice President of the FRG Bundestag Anne-Marie Renger, who presided over the meeting.

During a conversation with the Soviet delegation, Hans-Jochen Vogel pointed to the document "On the Principles of the Creation of Nuclear Free Corridor in Central Europe", that was worked out by the S.P.D. group in the Bundestag and the political leadership of the SUPG. [Sozialistiche - Einheitspartei Deutschland -- Socialist Unity Party of Germany]. The Soviet side has positively assessed the document.

When questions of the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe were discussed, deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet explained the proposals advanced in Budapest by the Warsaw Treaty member countries and suggested that a working group of NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty member countries be set up for their implementation.

In connection with the third meeting of representatives of the participating countries in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to be held in Vienna, the sides declared for the deepening of the European process.

The meetings were held in a businesslike and constructive atmosphere, in the spirit of the quest of new opportunities for interaction of the two countries in consolidating peace and deepending mutually advantageous cooperation.

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## RELATED ISSUES

### NIGERIAN ENVOY APPLAUDS USSR DISARMAMENT STANCE ON SOVIET TV

Lagos DAILY TIMES in English 4 Oct 86 p 3

[Text] The Nigeria ambassador to the Soviet Union, Alhaji Isa Modibbo, has said that Nigeria will continue to call for a total elimination of all weapons of destruction.

Alhaji Isa, who was spreaking on the USSR Central Television on Wednesday on Nigeria's 26th independence anniversary, said the huge amount spent on such weapons could be used to promote the welfare and development in the world.

He said Nigeria and the USSR had identical views on several global issues, "especially in areas of international peace, security, decolonisation, apartheid and neo-colonialism."

He said Nigeria was happy to note the positive steps taken by the USSR on disarmament, and especially on the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests declared by the USSR since August last year.

"We applaud this bold initiative of the USSR, which has contributed in reducing international tension and will, no doubt, go a long way in strengthening world peace and security," he noted.

Earlier in the day, Alhaji Isa held a reception at the embassy to mark the anniversary which was attended by the vice-president of the USSR, Mr Suleman Tatliyev and the deputy foreign minister USSR, Mr Leonid Ilyichev.

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